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THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Beth Stephens*
In Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), decided in June 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
the federal immunity statute, does not protect foreign government officials
sued in U.S. courts. The decision resolved longstanding splits among the
circuits and between the circuits and the Executive Branch on an issue that
is key to international relations and hotly contested around the world:
When are government officials immune from suit in the courts of a foreign
state? The Court remanded to the lower court to determine whether
common law immunity protects foreign officials such as the defendant, a
former official of Somalia who has been sued for torture and summary
execution.
With little guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts are now
charged with developing common law standards to determine when a
foreign official is immune from suit in the United States. Suits for human
rights violations will be particularly contentious, as the courts seek to
reconcile the competing demands of sovereign immunity and human rights
norms.
The courts will not be able to simply adopt common law principles
applied before the FSIA was enacted in 1976, because both international
and U.S. norms governing accountability for human rights violations have
changed dramatically since that time. Instead, courts should look for
guidance to international and domestic immunity principles and doctrines
developed in U.S. human rights litigation. When foreign officials violate
clearly defined, widely accepted international law norms, they act outside
of their lawful authority and are not entitled to immunity.
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Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) and a cooperating attorney with the Center for
Constitutional Rights, I have participated on the side of the plaintiffs in several of the
lawsuits discussed in this Article, including CJA’s Supreme Court litigation in Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). For comments on earlier drafts, I thank John Balzano,
William Casto, Roger S. Clark, William Dodge, Chimène Keitner, Lorna McGregor,
Gwynne Skinner, Allan Stein, and Ingrid Wuerth, as well as participants in the annual
workshop of the American Society of International Law’s Interest Group on International
Law in Domestic Courts. My special thanks to current and former law students for their
research assistance: Katharine Bodde, Christopher Markos, Amy Pahlka-Sellars, Katherine
Reilly, Rebecca Wasserman, and Michael Younker.
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INTRODUCTION
When government officials acting on behalf of the state abduct, torture,
or kill political opponents, can those officials be held personally
accountable? Under international law and the domestic law of most states,
the answer should be “yes.” Universally accepted international law norms
both prohibit state-sponsored arbitrary detention, torture, and summary
execution and require that perpetrators of human rights abuses be held
accountable. Most states incorporate some version of the international
norms into their domestic legal systems. In practice, however, progress
toward holding government officials accountable has been painstakingly
slow. States themselves are generally immune from legal actions in their
own courts and in the courts of other states. When facing criminal
prosecution or civil litigation for human rights abuses, state officials
inevitably assert that, because they acted on behalf of the state, they should
be protected by the same broad immunity that shields the state.
In dozens of human rights lawsuits against former foreign government
officials over the past thirty years, U.S. courts have rejected immunity
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claims. 1 With the exception of suits against heads of state, diplomats, and
others protected by specialized immunities, most courts have held that
human rights abuses were outside the officials’ lawful authority and,
therefore, outside the reach of official immunity. That general agreement,
however, masked splits among the circuits and between the courts and the
Executive Branch about the source and breadth of foreign official
immunity. Most circuits held that foreign officials were protected by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 2 but two held that the statute
applied only to the foreign state, not to its officials. 3 The Executive Branch
argued that the FSIA did not protect foreign officials, but that they were
instead protected by common law immunity. 4 Most decisions held that
immunity would not protect foreign officials accused of human rights
abuses. Those cases did not develop clear rules to govern which actions
taken in the course of employment were protected by immunity, however,
and two cases decided in 2008 and 2009 granted immunity without
considering whether the acts alleged violated international law.5
In Samantar v. Yousuf, 6 decided in June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court
resolved the most pressing circuit split, holding unanimously that foreign
officials are not protected by the FSIA. 7 The Court remanded to the lower
courts to resolve the two equally important remaining issues: Are foreign
officials protected by common law immunity? And, if common law
immunity does apply, what conduct falls within its protection?8 Answering
those questions will require courts to consider the significant evolution of
international and U.S. human rights norms over the past decades and the
impact of those changes on modern notions of sovereignty and sovereign
immunity.
The lower courts will find only minimal guidance from pre-FSIA
decisions involving the common law immunity of foreign officials. Those
cases were “few and far between,” 9 and none addressed claims of human
rights abuses. After passage of the FSIA in 1976, most courts held that the
statute governed foreign official immunity; as a result, the possible reach of
common law immunity received little attention. Moreover, even if the preFSIA common law provided clear standards, courts resolving claims of
human rights abuses could not simply adopt the rules as they existed in
1976. Significant changes in international human rights norms have altered
the standards governing personal accountability for human rights abuses.
These international developments are reflected in treaties ratified by the
1. For a discussion of the cases and Executive Branch views mentioned in this
paragraph, see infra Part I.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2006).
3. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
5. See the discussion of Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009), and Belhas v.
Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008), infra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
6. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
7. See id. at 2292–93.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2291.
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United States, in new U.S. statutes, and in U.S. judicial doctrines that the
modern common law must take into account.
The courts will be able to draw upon several bodies of law as they
develop a modern common law of official immunity applicable to
allegations of human rights abuses. The relevant international law
principles offer useful insights, although international law is ultimately
inconclusive, neither requiring nor prohibiting immunity for foreign
officials accused of human rights abuses. In addition, U.S. law governing
the immunity of domestic officials establishes an important framework for
key decisions about the scope of foreign official immunity.
Most helpful, however, are standards developed in human rights cases
over the past thirty years. First, in cases applying the FSIA to foreign
officials sued for human rights abuses, courts have generally held that such
abuses are outside the officials’ lawful authority and therefore not protected
by immunity. Although Samantar overruled the holding that the FSIA
governs foreign official immunity, the lower court cases addressed the same
underlying issue of immunity and lawful authority that will arise under the
common law, and their resolution of that issue remains relevant. Second,
cases refusing to apply the act of state doctrine to claims involving human
rights violations, because of the high degree of codification and consensus
underlying those norms, have developed standards that can be incorporated
into the new common law of foreign official immunity. Finally, in the 2004
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 10 the Supreme Court held that federal
courts are authorized to recognize a common law cause of action for
violations of clearly defined, widely accepted human rights norms. 11 In
developing common law rules to govern foreign official immunity, the
lower courts can adapt that pre-existing common law standard, recognizing
that violations of Sosa norms are not within the lawful authority of a foreign
official, and, therefore, that such acts are not protected by immunity.
Part I of this Article analyzes the history of the U.S. doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity, the passage of the FSIA, and the Samantar decision,
setting the stage for development of post-Samantar common law. Part II
examines some of the sources that courts will find useful in developing a
new common law of foreign official immunity, including international
immunity doctrines, U.S. domestic immunity principles, and pre-FSIA
common law. Part III analyzes the precedents found in human rights
decisions discussing the limits on FSIA immunity and the act of state
doctrine, as well as the common law guidance provided by the Sosa
decision. Part IV addresses crucial questions about the role of the
Executive Branch and foreign governments in determining the reach of
common law immunity.

10. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
11. Id. at 732 (holding that federal courts should recognize a common law cause of
action for violations of international norms with a “definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations” comparable to the norms in effect when the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), was enacted in the late eighteenth century).
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Finally, Part V outlines the modern common law of official immunity.
As explained in that section, foreign officials sued in their personal capacity
may be entitled to immunity from civil suit in the United States in some
circumstances, such as when the suit would compel the state to act, when
officials act in representation of the state, or when a judgment would
impose a rule of law on the state itself. However, officials accused of
violations of clearly defined, widely accepted international law norms
should not be entitled to immunity. Moreover, while courts should defer to
Executive Branch determinations of the status of foreign officials, they
should give only respectful consideration to Executive Branch conclusions
about whether the acts at issue are within lawful authority.
Hardly anyone today would claim that government officials can kidnap,
torture, and murder with impunity. International law both prohibits such
acts in the strongest terms and obligates states to provide redress to the
victims and survivors. One means by which states comply with that
obligation is by denying immunity to government officials accused of
egregious human rights abuses. Drawing upon a variety of international
and domestic law principles, the new common law of foreign official
immunity should reflect the commitment to hold accountable those accused
of egregious human rights violations.
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
IN U.S. LAW
Since 1980, victims and survivors of human rights abuses have filed
dozens of civil lawsuits in U.S. federal courts seeking damages from former
foreign government officials for abuses committed in the officials’ home
states. 12 These cases, which began with the Second Circuit’s decision in
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 13 have been filed under a handful of statutes
authorizing claims for a range of human rights abuses, including the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) 14 and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).15 In

12. For an overview of these cases, see Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the
Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773 app. at 810
(2008).
13. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATS permitted aliens to sue for torture
in U.S. courts); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (holding that courts should implement the ATS by
recognizing a common law cause of action for clearly defined, widely accepted violations of
international law).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing federal jurisdiction over a claim by an alien for a
“tort . . . in violation of the law of nations”).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (authorizing claims for torture and extrajudicial execution).
In addition to the ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), cases have been litigated
under the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333–2338 (2006) (creating a civil
cause of action for certain acts of terrorism), and the “state sponsor[s] of terrorism”
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West
2011) (permitting suits against states labeled “sponsor[s] of terrorism” by the U.S.
Department of State).
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most cases, the defendants committed the alleged violations while in a
position of authority within their government. 16
For almost thirty years, courts held that former officials were not entitled
to immunity, even when their governments were immune under the FSIA.
In a few cases, governments waived any immunity that might be claimed by
the former official.17 In most cases, the foreign government remained
silent, declining to suggest that the official’s acts were authorized or lawful.
In Filártiga, for example, the government of Paraguay made no
representations to the court, despite the defendant’s argument that his
torture and murder of a young man could be considered the public acts of
the Paraguayan government. 18
Two cases filed in 2005 against Israeli government officials, each
alleging war crimes and other human rights abuses, highlighted a question
that had been largely dormant in human rights cases: Are officials immune
if their governments assert that the alleged abuses were authorized? 19 In
each case, the government of Israel informed the court that the defendant
had been acting within his “official duties,” and the courts concluded that
the defendants were entitled to immunity. 20
The two Israeli-defendant decisions drew attention to longstanding
disagreements among the federal courts and between the courts and the
Executive Branch about whether the FSIA applied to foreign officials;
whether common law immunity protected any of those officials; and, if
officials were entitled to immunity under either theory, whether human
rights violations could fall within that immunity. The Supreme Court
decision in Samantar v. Yousuf answered one of these questions, holding
that the FSIA does not protect foreign government officials, but left the
others unresolved.
After reviewing the history of the disputes over the source and breadth of
foreign official immunity in U.S. law, this part analyzes the Samantar
decision and explains the issues facing the lower courts as they consider the
post-Samantar common law of foreign official immunity.
16. Many human rights violations require that the act be done with some official
authority. The Convention Against Torture, for example, defines torture as certain acts
“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. The
Convention Against Torture entered into force for the United States on November 20, 1994.
See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INT’L AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2010, at 465 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143863.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210–11 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (accepting
Haitian government’s waiver of any possible immunity to which the defendant, a former
head of state, might be entitled).
18. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 889–90.
19. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding immunity under common
law); Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding immunity under the
FSIA).
20. Matar, 563 F.3d at 11, 14; Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1284; see infra notes 75–81 and
accompanying text.
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A. Foreign Official Immunity Prior to Enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
Foreign official immunity is a derivative of the immunity of the official’s
state. 21 Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. government began
to limit the immunity offered to foreign states, but left unclear the
protections afforded to their officials, an issue that remains unresolved
today.
United States courts recognize foreign sovereign immunity not as a
constitutional obligation, but rather as “a matter of grace and comity.”22
Until 1952, the Executive Branch routinely asserted immunity claims on
behalf of friendly nations. 23 At that point, the U.S. Department of State
adopted the “restrictive” theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which
grants foreign states immunity only for public acts, not for commercial
acts. 24 Application of the restrictive theory after 1952 proved difficult.
Foreign governments seeking immunity applied political pressure on the
State Department. When the State Department did not offer its views, the
courts were tasked with discerning rules from often contradictory State
Department practices. 25 As a result, “sovereign immunity determinations
were made in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors,
sometimes including diplomatic considerations. Not surprisingly, the
governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.” 26
Most claims of foreign official immunity in U.S. courts involve the
specialized immunities granted to diplomats and consuls by international
treaties 27 or the common law immunity afforded to recognized heads of
state. 28 Cases against other foreign government officials were rare between
the adoption of the Constitution and the late twentieth century, and, as
Professor Chimène Keitner has detailed, the scattered cases were not always
consistent. 29 In the earliest discussions of foreign official immunity—two
21. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290–91 (2010) (“[W]e do not doubt that
in some circumstances the immunity of the foreign state extends to an individual for acts
taken in his official capacity.”).
22. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). See id. at 486–
89 for a detailed account of the history summarized in this paragraph.
23. Id. at 486.
24. The new approach was announced in a document known as the Tate Letter. Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y
Gen. (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–12 app. 2 (1976) [hereinafter Tate
Letter].
25. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–88.
26. Id. at 488.
27. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. For an overview of the immunities provided by these
treaties, see infra notes 148–49.
28. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing
common law head of state immunity).
29. The analysis of pre-FSIA foreign official cases in this section draws on an amicus
brief drafted by Professor Chimène Keitner and submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Samantar and on two articles by Keitner. See Brief of Professors of Public International and
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opinions issued in the 1790s—the U.S. Attorney General concluded that
foreign officials were not entitled to immunity in suits involving acts taken
within official authority, but that they could not be held liable for those acts
because of an early version of the act of state doctrine, a defense on the
merits but not a bar to litigation of the suit.30 In the nineteenth century, a
New York court rejected Alexander McLeod’s claim to immunity in a
criminal prosecution arising out of an attack on the Caroline, a steamboat
allegedly involved in acts of war against Canada.31 As Keitner has pointed
out, the court held that the fact that McLeod’s government had endorsed his
acts “by adopting and approving [his] crime[s]” did not “place[] the
offenders above the law.” 32 That is, the official could be prosecuted for
unlawful acts taken with the full authorization of his government.
Two early twentieth century cases denied immunity to foreign officials
accused of acting outside the scope of their authority. In Pilger v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 33 a New Jersey court held that immunity could not apply to a
lawsuit alleging that the defendant, a public trustee acting on behalf of the
government of Great Britain, had acted unlawfully. 34 Sovereign immunity,
the court ruled, did not extend to “suits arising out of the unlawful acts of
[the state’s] representatives,” and does not bar “suits brought against them
for the doing of such unlawful acts.” 35 Similarly, in Lyders v. Lund, 36 a
federal district court rejected the claim that a suit against a consul was in
fact an action against his government. 37 The court held that the official’s
immunity was limited to claims in which the state itself was the real party
in interest, not those where the officer acted “in excess of his authority or
under void authority” 38:
Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–14, Samantar v. Yousuf,
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555); Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign
Official Immunity, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 61 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, The Common Law];
Chimène I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2010), www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf
[hereinafter Keitner, Officially Immune?].
30. Actions Against Foreigners, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 81, 81 (1797) (suggesting that a
British official could be tried in a U.S. court for acts taken as part of his official position);
Suits Against Foreigners, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 45, 46 (1794) (opining that a French official was
subject to suit for acts taken while governor of a French colony); see Keitner, Officially
Immune?, supra note 29, at 11 (analyzing these opinions); see also Jones v. Le Tombe, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 383, 385 (1798) (dismissing a claim for refusal to pay a debt after finding that
there was no claim against the individual government official who had actually signed the
bills of exchange because the credit had been extended to the government of France, not to
him as an individual).
31. People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
32. Keitner, Officially Immune?, supra note 29, at 11 (quoting McLeod, 1 Hill at 377).
For a full history of the controversy surrounding the case and its contribution to the debate
over the defense of superior orders, see David J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of
Alexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY
L.J. 515 (1992).
33. 130 A. 523 (N.J. 1925).
34. Id. at 524.
35. Id.
36. 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929).
37. Id. at 308–09.
38. Id. at 309.
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[I]n actions against the officials of a foreign state not clothed with
diplomatic immunity, it can be said that suits based upon official,
authorized acts, performed within the scope of their duties on behalf of
the foreign state, and for which the foreign state will have to respond
directly or indirectly in the event of a judgment, are actions against the
foreign state. Acts of such officials, beyond the scope of their authority or
in connection with their private business, cannot be regarded as acts of the
foreign state, and the official may be sued on account of any such acts. 39

The courts decided only four cases against foreign officials in the years
between the 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory and passage of the FSIA
in 1976. 40 At least one case declined to afford immunity. 41 The other three
granted immunity, but none indicated that foreign officials were
automatically entitled to immunity for all acts committed in the course of
their employment: one case was dismissed because an absent government
agency was a real party in interest; 42 one granted immunity because the
case sought to enforce a contract against the foreign state; 43 and one granted
immunity without explanation. 44
These scattered decisions do provide support for two conclusions. First,
foreign officials were entitled to immunity in lawsuits in which a judgment
would in fact be enforceable against the state. Second, none of the preFSIA cases offer any indication that an official acting outside of lawful
authority would be entitled to immunity. These guidelines are generally
consistent with the rule adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law, which was in effect at the time the FSIA was debated and

39. Id. In a 2010 article, Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith stated
categorically that, prior to enactment of the FSIA, the common law extended immunity to
foreign officials sued in U.S. courts. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity and Domestic Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 137, 142 (2010). But the
cases they cited, id. at 142–44, stand for the more limited proposition that immunity
extended to “official, authorized acts, performed within the scope of [the officials’] duties on
behalf of the foreign state, and for which the foreign state will have to respond,” Lyders, 32
F.2d at 309, or where “‘the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state,’” Heaney v. Gov’t of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66(f)
(1965)). This language is entirely consistent with the views expressed here: Acts beyond an
official’s authority are not entitled to immunity.
40. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Dep’t of State, May 1952 to Jan. 1977
(Michael Sandler, Detlev F. Vagts, & Bruno A. Ristau eds.), in 1977 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT’L
L. 1017, 1020 [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity Decisions] (cited in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130
S. Ct. 2278, 2291 n.18 (2010)). The survey found a total of 110 foreign sovereign immunity
cases during that period. Id. at 1080. Two additional cases claimed head-of-state immunity.
Id.
41. See Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 29, at 72–73 & n.35 (citing Sovereign
Immunity Decisions, supra note 40, at 1062) (discussing Cole v. Heidtman (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
where the Executive Branch declined to suggest immunity for a government official accused
of civil rights violations).
42. Oliner v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 34 A.D.2d 310, 315 (1970).
43. Heaney, 445 F.2d at 503–04.
44. Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
1976).
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enacted. 45 The Restatement (Second) stated that the immunity of a foreign
state extended to heads of state, foreign ministers, and “any other public
minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his
official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a
rule of law against the state.” 46 A comment to that section added:
Public ministers, officials, or agents of a state . . . do not have immunity
from personal liability even for acts carried out in their official capacity,
unless the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule
against the foreign state or unless they have one of the specialized
immunities [such as diplomatic or consular immunity]. 47

As this language made clear, foreign officials were not immunized for all
acts performed in an official capacity, but only for those in which the state
itself would be bound by a judgment against the official.
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Foreign Officials
Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976 “to free the Government from the
case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to
‘assur[e] litigants that . . . decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process.’” 48 The FSIA, the “sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts,” 49 recognized
foreign sovereign immunity as the rule, while providing a list of exceptions
to that immunity that largely codified the restrictive theory. 50
Very few human rights claims fall within one of the exceptions, which
generally require either torts or contractual arrangements occurring in the
United States or commercial activity that has a significant impact within the
United States. 51 The Supreme Court in Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. 52 specifically rejected the argument that violations of
international law triggered an additional, implicit exception to immunity,
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66 (1965). The Restatement (Second) has been superseded by the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) (1965) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 66 cmt. b.
48. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976)).
49. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (stating general rule of immunity); id. § 1605 (listing
exceptions to immunity). For a description of the requirements of the separate provision
permitting some claims against “state sponsor[s] of terrorism,” 28 U.S.C.A § 1605A (West
2011), see infra note 54.
51. See exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Two cases held foreign governments
liable for the assassinations of political opponents within the United States under the
§ 1605(a)(5) exception for deaths occurring in the United States. See Liu v. Republic of
China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1980). In another case, the court held that a government implicitly waived its
immunity to a claim alleging torture. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 720–22 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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and, as a result, dismissed claims against Argentina for the bombing of a
commercial oil tanker at sea in violation of the laws of war. 53 Congress in
1994 rejected an effort to create an additional broad exception for some
human rights abuses but adopted a limited exception for lawsuits by U.S.
nationals filed against a state on the State Department’s list of “state
sponsor[s] of terrorism.” 54 As a result, with the exception of claims for
violations committed within the United States and those filed against states
on the “sponsors of terrorism” list, foreign states are generally immune
from suit in U.S. courts for human rights abuses.
Perhaps because there had previously been only a handful of cases
against foreign officials in U.S. courts, the debates preceding the enactment
of the FSIA contained no indication that Congress intended the statute to
apply to foreign officials, and there was no mention of officials in the
statute. 55 The Executive Branch, which drafted the statute and strongly
urged Congress to enact it, viewed it as applying only to foreign states, not
to their officials. 56
Despite the statutory silence, the Ninth Circuit in 1990 concluded that
Congress must have intended that the FSIA protect foreign officials acting
within their official capacity. In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,57
the circuit dismissed a lawsuit against Raul Daza, a Philippine government
official sued after he instructed the California branch of the Philippine
National Bank to dishonor a letter of credit. Daza acted on government
instructions after a Philippine government commission determined that the
letter of credit was the result of a fraudulent transaction. 58 The Ninth
Circuit held that the FSIA applied to an individual official such as Daza
“for acts committed in his official capacity,” but not for “acts beyond the

53. Id. at 431, 436, 443. For a contrary view, see the dissenting opinion of Judge
Patricia Wald in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176–84 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), amended by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (replacing § 1605(a)(7) with § 1605A)
(authorizing claims for torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage-taking).
The list of state sponsors of terrorism currently includes Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. See 22
C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2009). Iraq, Libya, and North Korea were on the list when the exception
was enacted in 1996, but have since been removed. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (1996).
When originally introduced in Congress, the proposal would have created an FSIA
exception to immunity for all foreign states sued for human rights violations; last-minute
negotiations limited the final version to claims against “state sponsors of terrorism.” See
ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 293–97 (2001) (explaining the
compromise that limited the statute to the short list of “state sponsors of terrorism.”).
55. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 n.12 (2010) (noting references that
suggest that Congress did not intend statute to apply to individuals); id. at 2291 (“The
immunity of officials simply was not the particular problem to which Congress was
responding when it enacted the FSIA.”).
56. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions, supra note 40, at 1020 (“[T]he Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act does not deal with the immunity of individual officials, but only
that of foreign states and their political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.”).
57. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 1097.
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scope of his authority.” 59 Holding that Daza’s actions were within his
official capacity, the court applied the FSIA, and, since the acts did not fall
within one of the FSIA exceptions to immunity, the court dismissed the
case. 60 The court assumed that the FSIA occupied the field, so that it must
either find a source of immunity within the statute or hold that Daza was
not immune from suit. 61
The Executive Branch agreed that Daza was entitled to immunity, but
based on common law, not on the FSIA. 62 Indeed, the Executive Branch
has consistently maintained that the FSIA only addresses the immunity of
foreign states, and that foreign official immunity is governed by common
law immunity doctrines that pre-date the FSIA and survived its passage.63
Until 2009, no court had adopted that view.64 Instead, four circuits
followed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chuidian, finding that the FSIA
covered government employees acting within their authority. 65 Two
circuits disagreed, including the Fourth Circuit in Yousuf v. Samantar,66
setting up the circuit split and the split between the courts and the Executive
Branch that the Supreme Court resolved in Samantar.
Until 2009, the dispute about the application of the FSIA to foreign
officials had no impact on human rights claims, because Chuidian and the
cases that adopted its holding limited FSIA immunity to acts committed
within official authority, and the courts consistently held that human rights
abuses were not within that authority. Shortly after the Chuidian decision,
for example, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that Chuidian would not bar
claims for human rights abuses because such acts were “beyond the scope
of [the official’s] authority,” and involved “doing something the sovereign

59. Id. at 1103, 1106. The court reached this ruling by finding that a foreign official fell
within the FSIA’s definition of “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” Id. at 1098
(analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1603).
60. Id. at 1105–06.
61. The Chuidian court relied on the assumption that the FSIA had eliminated all
common law foreign sovereign immunity and replaced it with statutory norms, leaving the
FSIA as the only source of immunity for officials, as well as for states. Id. at 1102 (“[W]e
disagree with the government that the Act can reasonably be interpreted to leave intact the
pre-1976 common law with respect to foreign officials.”).
62. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 4–6, Chuidian, 912 F.2d 1095 (No.
86-2255).
63. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions, supra note 40, at 1020; Brief for the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 9–18, Matar v. Dichter, 563
F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2579) [hereinafter U.S. Matar Amicus Brief]. The Matar
filing is scathing in its review of Chuidian’s conclusion that the FSIA applies to government
officials, stating that the statutory analysis is “unpersuasive,” “flawed,” and “inconsistent
with [the FSIA’s] text and legislative history.” U.S. Matar Amicus Brief at 15.
64. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing Matar).
65. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2008);
Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion
Forestal y Industrial de Olancho, 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
66. 552 F.3d 371, 379–83 (4th Cir. 2009); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881–83
(7th Cir. 2005).
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has not empowered the official to do.” 67 In a class action against the estate
of former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the court held that the
alleged “acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts
outside of his authority as President,” 68 and that “acts [that] were not taken
within any official mandate” 69 did not fall within the immunity of the FSIA.
“[T]he illegal acts of a dictator,” the court concluded, “are not ‘official acts’
unreviewable by federal courts.” 70
States generally did not claim that the human rights abuses alleged
against their former officials were committed within lawful authority. In
one exception, the government of China sought to assert immunity on
behalf of a Chinese government official in a case alleging torture and
arbitrary detention.71 The Chinese government sent a letter to the State
Department stating that, when government officials such as the defendant
“performed their functions and duties in accordance with the power
entrusted to them under [the] Chinese Constitution and laws,” the actions
should be seen as public acts of state that were immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.72 The district court,
however, refused to afford immunity to the defendant because his acts were
outside the scope of his authority: “Where the officer’s powers are limited
by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual
and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the
sovereign has empowered him to do.” 73 The court found that the acts
alleged by the plaintiffs violated Chinese law, which specifically prohibited
arbitrary detention, torture, and other physical abuse of detainees.74 The
67. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing claims against
Imee Marcos-Manotoc, daughter of Ferdinand Marcos).
68. Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472
(9th Cir. 1994).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1471. The court in Hilao v. Marcos also rejected defendant Marcos’ argument
that acts outside the scope of his official authority (and thus not immunized by the FSIA) did
not violate international law because such acts were not committed under “color of
authority.” Id. at 1472 n.8. The court held that “[a]n official acting under color of authority,
but not within an official mandate, can violate international law and not be entitled to
immunity under [the] FSIA.” Id. (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980)).
71. Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
72. Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on “Falun Gong”
Unwarranted Lawsuits (unpaginated) at 3, 5, attached to Notice of Filing of Original
Statement by the Chinese Government, Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (No. C 02 0672
(EMC)).
73. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (quoting Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912
F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)).
74. Id. at 1285. The court also rejected the argument that the defendant’s acts were
within the scope of his authority because they had been authorized by the government’s
“covert unofficial policy.” Id. at 1286. Since “ultra vires actions are not subject to sovereign
immunity,” government officials are entitled to immunity only if they act with a “legally
valid grant of authority.” Id. at 1287 (citing United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d
853 (9th Cir. 1986)). For an overview of the Chinese government’s detention and other
harsh treatment of Falun Gong practitioners, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2009 COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU)
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135989.htm.
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court in Doe I v. Liu Qi thus refused to grant immunity where the
government merely asserted that an official was performing a job-related
task. The court instead undertook an independent assessment of the
government’s claim that the acts were lawful.
In two cases against Israeli government officials, U.S. courts granted
immunity based on the government’s general statements that the officials
acted within the scope of their authority, without considering the illegality
of the underlying acts. The result enabled Israel to avoid taking a position
on a key issue: Were the acts alleged in the complaints within the lawful
authority of the officials? The first case, Belhas v. Ya’alon, 75 was filed by
survivors of an Israeli missile attack on a Palestinian refugee camp in
Lebanon. The defendant, an Israeli general, submitted a letter from the
Israeli Ambassador stating that “‘anything [he] did in connection with the
events at issue in the suit[] was in the course of [his] official duties.’”76
The court accepted this argument, holding that the acts fell within the
defendant’s official authority and thus within the protections of the FSIA,
even though Israel never confronted the allegations of the complaint.77
Similarly, in Matar v. Dichter, 78 a lawsuit challenging the bombing of a
civilian apartment building in Gaza, the court relied on a letter from the
Israeli government that used the same language as the Belhas letter, stating
that “‘anything Mr. Dichter did . . . in connection with the events at issue
[in the suit] was in the course of [his] official duties.’” 79 The State
Department filed a Statement of Interest urging the court to dismiss the
claim based on common law immunity. 80 The Second Circuit in Matar
agreed, holding that the acts were protected by common law immunity.81
Matar was the first case to adopt the Executive Branch view that common
law governs foreign official immunity.
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Samantar, three
questions were pending: Are foreign officials protected by the FSIA? Are
foreign officials protected by common law immunity? If any immunity
protects foreign officials, does it immunize all acts taken in the course of
their employment, including human rights violations? In Samantar, the
Supreme Court directly answered only the first of those questions, although
the opinion sets the framework for lower court consideration of the second
and third issues.
C. Samantar and the End of Statutory Foreign Official Immunity
The Samantar case illustrates the tension between sovereign immunity
and human rights accountability. In 1981, Bashe Abdi Yousuf was arrested
75. 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
76. Id. at 1282 (quoting Letter from Daniel Ayalon, Ambassador to the U.S., State of
Isr., to Nicholas Burns, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, State Dep’t (Feb. 6, 2006)).
77. Id. at 1283–84.
78. 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
79. Id. at 11 (quoting Letter from Daniel Ayalon to Nicholas Burns, supra note 76).
80. Id.; see U.S. Matar Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 11.
81. Matar, 563 F.3d at 13–14.
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in northern Somalia by security forces operating under the command of
Mohamed Ali Samantar, then Minister of Defense of Somalia. 82 Yousuf, a
community organizer, was brutally tortured and detained in solitary
confinement for seven years. Years later, after discovering that Samantar
was living in Virginia, Yousuf filed a lawsuit against him in federal district
court. He was joined in the lawsuit by other Somalis who had themselves
been tortured and imprisoned by Samantar’s forces or who were relatives of
people killed by those forces.
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Samantar was
protected by foreign sovereign immunity because he was at all times acting
“‘in an official capacity, and not for personal reasons or motivation.’”83
The court relied on letters from representatives of the Somali Transitional
Federal Government that stated that Samantar’s alleged actions were taken
in his official capacity, 84 although the United States did not recognize that
government. 85 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal,
holding that the FSIA did not apply to foreign officials and, therefore, did
not protect Samantar. 86 The court remanded the case to the district court to
consider whether Samantar was entitled to common law immunity. 87 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over the
application of the FSIA to foreign officials.88 The Executive Branch filed a
brief that reiterated the position it had taken consistently since the passage
of the FSIA: The statute does not apply to foreign officials, but they are
protected by a nonstatutory immunity that survived passage of the FSIA. 89
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court rejected application of the
FSIA, holding that the statute does not apply to foreign officials. 90 The
decision turned upon statutory construction, holding that the clear language
of the statute, bolstered by its legislative history, 91 indicated that Congress
did not intend to include foreign officials within its reach. The Court

82. For the facts of the case, see Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373–74 (4th Cir.
2009), and the website of the Center for Justice and Accountability, counsel for the
plaintiffs, at http://cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=85 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
83. Samantar, 552 F.3d at 376 (quoting Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL
2220579, at *14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007)).
84. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.3 (2010). The government of
Somaliland, a de facto state with an unrecognized government that currently governs the
region in which the abuses took place, also wrote to the court, stating that the acts alleged
did not constitute official actions. Brief for the Respondents at 7, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 265636 (citing Somaliland letter).
85. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283 n.3 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 5, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter
U.S. Samantar Brief]).
86. Samantar, 552 F.3d at 379–83.
87. Id. at 383–84.
88. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).
89. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 6 (“In the view of the United States,
principles articulated by the Executive Branch, not the FSIA, properly govern the immunity
of foreign officials from civil suit for acts in their official capacity.”).
90. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285–92.
91. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each wrote a separate concurring opinion
objecting to the majority’s reliance on legislative history to support the result. Id. at 2293.
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affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to remand the case to the trial court
to consider Samantar’s other defenses, including whether he is protected by
common law immunity. 92
The Court’s discussion of the substance of any common law immunity
was understandably meager, given that the lower courts did not reach the
issue. The opinion did provide guideposts, however, that are likely to be
used as a foundation for lower court analysis of the issue. To begin, the
opinion recognizes that a foreign official may be protected by common law
immunity in some circumstances: “Even if a suit is not governed by the
[FSIA], it may still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity under the
common law.” 93 The official’s immunity is derivative of state immunity,
but is not “coextensive with the law of state immunity.” 94 That is, “in some
circumstances the immunity of the foreign state extends to an individual for
acts taken in his official capacity.” 95
The Court offered no indication of the “circumstances” in which
immunity would protect an official, and no explanation of when an act is to
be characterized as “taken in official capacity.” While quoting the
Restatement (Second) caveat that a foreign official is only immune “‘if the
effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against
the state,’” 96 the Court dropped a footnote to avoid any endorsement of that
view. 97
However, the reasoning employed by the Court to analyze the FSIA did
provide a few lessons. First, Samantar recognized that any immunity to
which an official is entitled is derivative of the immunity of the state,
stating that the foreign state’s immunity, “in some circumstances,” may
“extend[] to an individual.” 98 This suggests that, since the official has no
independent immunity, any foreign official immunity can be waived by the
state. 99 Second, foreign official immunity is not co-extensive with the
92. After the remand, the Executive Branch filed a Statement of Interest concluding that
Samantar was not entitled to immunity, Statement of Interest of the United States of
America, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Statement of Interest, Yousuf v. Samantar], and the District Court promptly
issued an order rejecting Samantar’s immunity defense, Order, Yousuf v. Samantar,
1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011). For a discussion of the Statement of
Interest, see infra notes 280–83 and accompanying text.
93. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292.
94. Id. at 2289.
95. Id. at 2290–91 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 2290 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66(f) (1965)).
97. “We express no view on whether Restatement § 66 correctly sets out the scope of the
common law immunity applicable to current or former foreign officials.” Id. at 2290 n.15.
98. Id. at 2290–91.
99. See also U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 26 (“[A] foreign state may seek to
waive the immunity of a current or former official, because immunity is accorded to foreign
officials not for their personal benefit, but for the benefit of the foreign state.” (emphasis
added)). Given that an official’s immunity is derived from that of the state, the state has the
authority to waive that immunity. See Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210–11 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (accepting Haitian government’s waiver of any possible immunity to which the
defendant, a former head of state, might be entitled).

2011]

FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

2685

immunity of the state. The Court rejected the argument that, since states
can only act through individuals, state immunity would be drained of
meaning if the state’s representatives were not immunized to the same
extent as the state.100 The Court noted that states can protect themselves
from the impact of litigation aimed at their officials through two
doctrines—real party in interest and indispensable party—that would enable
a state to obtain dismissal of suits that affect their interests.101 Finally, the
Court’s reliance on the real party in interest and indispensable party
doctrines suggested that the Court was concerned with protecting the legal
interests of the state—not its political, diplomatic, or policy interests. That
is, Samantar indicated that a state’s interest in obtaining immunity for its
officials would be satisfied to the extent that the state can protect itself from
a judgment that would impact its legal interests.
With just that basic framework from the Court, the lower courts now face
the task of discerning the substance of the common law of foreign official
immunity. 102 As explained in Part II, courts will derive useful—although
not definitive—guidance from international law, U.S. domestic immunity
doctrines, and early cases addressing common law immunity. Part III will
discuss the more substantive guidance found in the many cases that have
applied FSIA immunity and the act of state doctrine to defendants accused
of human rights abuses, and in the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision, which
recognized common law causes of action for human rights claims. 103
II.

BACKGROUND SOURCES FOR THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF
FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

After rejecting the FSIA as a source of immunity for foreign officials, the
Supreme Court in Samantar remanded the case to the lower courts to
determine whether, and under what circumstances, those officials would be

100. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (“[O]ur reading of the FSIA will not ‘in effect make
the statute optional,’ as some Courts of Appeals have feared, by allowing litigants through
‘artful pleading . . . to take advantage of the Act’s provisions or, alternatively, choose to
proceed under the old common law . . . .’” (quoting Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912
F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1990)).
101. “[I]t may be the case that some actions against an official in his official capacity
should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in
interest.” Id. If a case attacks the interests of the foreign state, the state may be an
indispensable party because it has “‘an interest relating to the subject of the action’ and
‘disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or
impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B))
(citing Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008) (“[W]here sovereign
immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal of the
action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests of the absent
sovereign.”)).
102. Two post-Samantar district court decisions denied defendants’ claims to common
law immunity: Yousuf v. Samantar, 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011) (after
remand from the Supreme Court), see infra notes 280–85 and accompanying text, and
Hassen v. Al Nahyan, CV 09-01106 DMG (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010), see infra
notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
103. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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protected by common law immunity for acts taken in their course of their
employment.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins104
famously imposed strict limits on the federal court’s common law-making
power. Issues relating to foreign affairs, however, fall within one of the
remaining “enclaves” of federal common law: Federal courts are
empowered to develop common law rules in “narrow areas,” including
“international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign
nations,” 105 because of the “uniquely federal interests in foreign affairs.”106
To determine the substance of the applicable common law in cases that
involve foreign affairs, federal courts fashion rules that take into account
the foreign policy interests of the federal government. 107 In an area
touching upon relations with foreign governments and their officials, courts
developing common law rules are likely to consider relevant international
law doctrines. They are also likely to look at analogous domestic law
principles and judicial decisions in related areas.108
Each of these sources has significant limitations, as discussed in the
following sections. There is no binding international law governing the
scope of official immunity. Domestic immunity doctrines offer interesting
insights, but are based on a distinct constitutional foundation. United States
courts today cannot simply apply pre-FSIA common law decisions. Those
decisions were sparse and provided minimal guidance, and intervening
developments in international and domestic law have largely superseded
them.
Nevertheless, although none of these sources provides a clear rule,
together they offer substantial insight to guide development of rules of
common law immunity. The analysis of international and domestic
immunity doctrines in this part is followed in Part III by a discussion of the
limits on lawful authority that will inform the modern common law of
official immunity.
A. International Law: Neither Prohibited Nor Required
The U.S. law of sovereign immunity has developed in coordination with
international law. In enacting the FSIA in 1976, Congress referred
104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
105. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
106. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 383 (5th ed. 2007).
107. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–23 (1964) (adopting
the rule most suited to protecting the interests of the federal government in an act of state
case).
108. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 30–35, 39–46) (suggesting that courts look at customary international law and at policies
reflected in U.S. domestic law in developing the common law of immunity); Ingrid Wuerth,
Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State
Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 53–54), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811604
(suggesting
that,
in
determining the federal common law of official immunity, courts look to the guidance
offered by domestic statutes, particularly the FSIA, and to international law).
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explicitly to then-existing customary international law; 109 as a result, the
courts frequently refer to international law when interpreting the statute.110
The Executive Branch has expressed its concern with respecting
international law immunity rules, in part so that other states will show
similar concern in their treatment of U.S. government officials. 111 As a
result, courts will consider international law rules as they develop the U.S.
common law of foreign official immunity. However, there are no binding,
comprehensive international treaties or customary international law norms
governing the immunity of foreign officials. Thus, although international
law principles will be of interest as the courts formulate a common law
approach, an analysis of international law will not resolve the issue.
1. The Curious History of Sovereign Immunity
No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order
to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its peoples.
– Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General 112
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed from the concept of
sovereignty: In recognition of their equal sovereign status, states accepted
limits on their ability to judge the conduct of other states. Both doctrines,
however, have been significantly weakened by the dramatic expansion of
substantive international human rights protections that began in the second
half of the twentieth century. Through human rights norms, states have
accepted significant limits on their own behavior and imposed those limits
on other states. States have also accepted obligations to hold accountable
those who violate human rights norms.
The concept of absolute state sovereignty was articulated in the mideighteenth century by Emerich Vattel, who declared in his influential
treatise that “all [sovereign states] have a right to be governed as they think
proper, and that none have the least authority to interfere in the government
of another.” 113 As the Supreme Court stated in the following century, “The
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) (including a reference to international law in the
section declaring the purpose of the FSIA).
110. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 (2010) (stating that one purpose
of the FSIA was “‘codification of international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment’”
(quoting Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193,
199 (2007))).
111. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 27 (“[F]idelity to international norms and the
protection of United States officials abroad are important factors that the Executive Branch
considers in determining whether to suggest immunity for particular foreign officials.”).
112. Press Release, Secretary-General Calls for Renewed Commitment in New Century
To Protect Rights of Man, Woman, Child—Regardless of Ethnic, National Belonging, U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/6949, HR/CN/898 (Apr. 7, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990407.sgsm6949.html.
113. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE bk. II, ch. 4 § 54 (Thomas M. Pomroy 1805) (1758); see STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 21 (1999) (discussing Vattel’s use of the term
“nonintervention”).
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and absolute.” 114 In the modern era, the U.N. Charter codified state
authority over domestic affairs, specifying that, with the exception of issues
that affect international peace and security, the United Nations is not
authorized “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.” 115
Despite repeated invocations of each state’s right to absolute domestic
sovereignty, the practical reality has long been far different. Throughout
the history of sovereign states, “[r]ulers have intervened in the internal
affairs of other states through coercion and imposition and invited the
insinuation of external authority in their own polities through contracting
and conventions.” 116 During the centuries since the modern state emerged,
states have repeatedly invaded other states in order to rearrange their
internal affairs, have used economic coercion to achieve the same result,
and have entered into agreements whereby they “voluntarily” agreed to
cede some part of their internal authority—whether truly voluntary or as a
result of military or economic threats.117
Moreover, while extolling sovereign authority over internal affairs in its
Charter, the United Nations led the movement to codify human rights
commitments that restricted the domestic authority of member states.118
These protections are now included in widely ratified multilateral treaties,
and many are recognized as jus cogens norms, binding on all states whether
or not they consent, or as norms of customary international law, binding on
all states unless they make timely objections.119 Human rights obligations
impose crucial limits on a state’s power over persons and things within its
territory.
Professor John Jackson has highlighted the “antiquated” nature of
sovereignty understood as “a nation-state’s supreme absolute power and
authority over its subjects and territory,” 120 which he characterized as “the
nation-state’s power to violate virgins, chop off heads, arbitrarily confiscate
114. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
115. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
116. KRASNER, supra note 113, at 125.
117. See Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty,
and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1078–84 (2004) (describing interventions
in the internal affairs of other states as “an enduring characteristic of the sovereign state
system” and offering multiple examples).
118. See KRASNER, supra note 113, at 126 (describing human rights norms as “the latest
example of a long-standing tension between autonomy and international attempts to regulate
relations between rulers and ruled”); Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1999) (stating
that “the idea of human rights” caused “a major rent” in “the cloak of sovereignty”).
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) (defining customary international law as “a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”); id. § 102 cmt. d (noting that a
state is not bound by a customary international law norm if it objects during its formation);
id. § 102 cmt. k (defining jus cogens norms as rules of international law “recognized by the
international community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation”); id. § 702
(listing violations of the customary law of human rights).
120. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 790 (2003).
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property, torture citizens, and engage in all sorts of other excessive and
inappropriate actions.” 121 “Today,” he observes, “no sensible person would
agree that this antiquated version of sovereignty exists. A multitude of
treaties and customary international law norms impose international legal
constraints (at the least) that circumscribe extreme forms of arbitrary
actions even against a sovereign’s own citizens.” 122
Despite the archaic implications of the absolutist concept of sovereignty,
its ongoing impact is evident in tensions over efforts to enforce human
rights protections. Although substantive human rights norms now apply to
all states, most norms include weak or no enforcement mechanisms.123
Meanwhile, states routinely invoke sovereignty and non-interference in
domestic affairs to deter efforts to enforce human rights norms.
One means by which states deflect efforts to enforce human rights norms
is by claiming immunity. Sovereign immunity began as the personal
immunity of monarchs and their diplomatic representatives.124 At the time
the theory developed, “most States were ruled by personal sovereigns who,
in a very real sense, personified the State.” 125 Courts viewed immunity as
“highly personalized” and necessary “to preserve the dignity of the foreign
sovereign.” 126 Early treatises on international law addressed the immunity
of heads of state and diplomats, not the abstract entity of the state itself or
its lower-ranking officials. 127
The Supreme Court’s 1812 decision in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon 128 applied the personal immunity of royal sovereigns to the
distinct entity of the state and its possessions. In an opinion by Chief
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. For example, several human rights treaties establish committees empowered to
monitor compliance, but without enforcement powers. See, e.g., Convention Against
Torture, supra note 16, arts. 17–24 (creating the Committee Against Torture to monitor
compliance and issue its “views” of possible violations of the Convention). International
and hybrid criminal tribunals have limited mandates. The jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court is limited to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, see Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, while the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the hybrid
international-domestic criminal tribunals for Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo are each
limited to conflicts in individual locations, see Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability
for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L.
251, 267–310 (2007) (explaining the background and limited mandate of each of the
criminal tribunals).
124. See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 745 n.31 (2003) (citing THEODORE
R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 7 (1970)) (recounting this history).
125. Harvard Law School, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J.
INT’L L. SUPP. 451, 527 (1932) (draft convention with reporter commentary).
126. Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J.
INT’L L. 489, 496 (1992).
127. ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 12 n.4 (2008)
(citing treatises from the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries).
128. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the United States should refrain
from asserting jurisdiction over a French warship seized within U.S.
territory:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound
by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his
nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of
another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. 129

Marshall, however, presented the conflicting rule of sovereign territorial
jurisdiction with equal force: “The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no
limitation, not imposed by itself.” 130 Nations agreed, he wrote, to waive a
portion of that absolute jurisdiction in certain “peculiar circumstances”131
that included claims against a head of state or foreign minister and those at
issue in The Schooner Exchange: claims against a foreign sovereign’s
troops or warships when the forum state has explicitly or implicitly given
them leave to enter its territory. 132 While the forum state was not bound to
grant immunity, it refrained from exercising jurisdiction because of its
explicit or implicit consent and remained free to withdraw that consent.133
Despite the limited holding of The Schooner Exchange, the opinion
“came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign
sovereigns.” 134 Absolute sovereign immunity, however, is subject to the
same historical challenge as absolute sovereignty. In her exhaustive survey,
Roseanne Van Alebeek demonstrated that, over the course of several
centuries, many states in practice followed only a limited version of
sovereign immunity. 135
As a foundation for a discussion of the common law of official immunity,
this curious history offers an important lesson. Both absolute sovereignty
and absolute sovereign immunity have historical roots in a world governed
by absolute monarchies, far removed from modern state structures. Neither
doctrine is as firmly entrenched in historical practice as supporters often
claim. This foundation has been further undermined by the modern human
rights norms developed in the aftermath of World War II. Through a
comprehensive body of treaty law, much of which is now recognized as
129. Id. at 137.
130. Id. at 136.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 137–43.
133. “Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication.
He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force, or by subjecting such
vessels to the ordinary tribunals.” Id. at 146.
134. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). The Verlinden
Court also stressed another significant prong of the case: “[A]s The Schooner Exchange
made clear, . . . foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the
United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.” Id.
135. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 127, at 14–21.
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customary international law, the international community has agreed upon a
detailed list of obligations that impose limits on state behavior within their
own territories and require both that victims of abuses receive redress and
that violators be held accountable.136 Neither absolute sovereignty nor
absolute sovereign immunity is consistent with modern human rights
obligations.
2. International Law, Human Rights, and Sovereign Immunity
Although some states continue to recognize absolute sovereign
immunity, 137 the restrictive theory now dominates modern sovereign
immunity doctrine. 138 Under the restrictive theory, “the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure
imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).”139
States adopting the restrictive theory, however, have not reached consensus
on how to draw the crucial line between immunized public acts and nonimmunized private acts. In the absence of an internationally accepted
distinction, each state draws the line in its domestic law according to its
own assessment of the relevant international, diplomatic, and political
interests at stake. As a result, the restrictive doctrine has led to an
“extraordinary complexity and variety in the emerging rules,” 140 with
consensus “only at a rather high level of abstraction.”141
The limited domestic and international codification in this area
exacerbates the lack of clarity as to the rules governing sovereign immunity.
Very few states even have domestic statutes governing foreign sovereign
immunity. 142 Two broad international treaties have been drafted and
136. For a discussion of the evolution of victims’ rights in international law, see M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203
(2006).
137. See Kate Parlett, Immunity in Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging
Exception, 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 49, 52–53 (stating that, as of 2006, at least fifteen
states still applied absolute sovereign immunity). The former socialist states have been the
strongest opponents of the restrictive theory. Caplan, supra note 124, at 749 (noting that
socialist theory held that, because politics and trade were both public functions of the
socialist state, they were equally entitled to sovereign immunity); Donoghue, supra note 126,
at 490 (same).
138. As noted in the previous section, supra notes 24, 48–50 and accompanying text, the
United States adopted the restrictive theory in 1952 and codified it in the FSIA in 1976.
139. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976); see
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. In enacting the FSIA, Congress intended to codify the restrictive
theory’s limitation of immunity to sovereign acts. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992).
140. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 127 (2002). In the second edition of her
treatise, Fox reiterated that “[t]he restrictive doctrine and the criteria . . . on which it depends
have not produced uniformity of practice nor reliable guidance as to when a national court
will assume or refuse jurisdiction.” HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 530 (2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter FOX, STATE IMMUNITY].
141. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51,
61 (1992); see also Donoghue, supra note 126, at 491 (noting that “simply put, there exists
no coherent restrictive theory”).
142. The immunity statutes of the United Kingdom, Argentina, Australia, Canada,
Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa are reprinted in ANDREW DICKINSON ET AL., STATE
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opened for ratification, but neither is widely ratified and neither has come
into force. 143 As a result, sovereign immunity continues to be governed
primarily by uncodified domestic rules, often focused on domestic
interpretations of customary international law, as filtered through each
state’s constitutional and judicial doctrines.
States recognize different exceptions to sovereign immunity. The United
States permits suits for torts committed within U.S. territory, including
human rights abuses. 144 Both Greece and Italy have denied Germany’s
claims of immunity in lawsuits arising out of abuses committed in their
territory during World War II. 145 The United States also permits suits for
torture and extrajudicial killing against states on the U.S. list of “state

IMMUNITY: SELECTED MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 329–442, 461–522 (2004). Fox
mentions that Malaysia and Malawi also have immunity statutes, as do “other small common
law jurisdictions” such as St. Kitts. FOX, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 140, at 201 n.1.
143. The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, Dec. 2, 2004, U.N. Doc A/59/38 [hereinafter Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities], will come into force when thirty states have ratified it. Id. art. 30. As of
February 2011, only eleven states had become parties to the treaty (Austria, Iran, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Romania), while twenty-eight states had signed it. For the status of signatures and
ratifications, see http://treaties.un.org (last visited April 20, 2011).
The European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, E.T.S. 074, 11 I.L.M. 470,
had been ratified by only eight states as of February 2011, with no new ratifications or
signatures since 1990.
For the status of signatures and ratifications, see
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=074&CM=1&DF=14/03/20
11&CL=ENG (last visited April 20, 2011).
144. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
execution of political opponents in California triggered tort exception to FSIA); Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (applying exception to assert
jurisdiction over claim for assassination committed in Washington, D.C.).
145. The Greek case, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios
Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000 (Greece), awarded damages for a German massacre
of over 200 Greek civilians. For a summary of the facts, see Elena Vournas, Prefecture of
Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany: Sovereign Immunity and the Exception for Jus
Cogens Violations, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629, 635 (2002). A later Greek
decision refused to allow enforcement of the judgment. See Andrea Gattini, To What Extent
Are State Immunity and Non-Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’ Claims for War
Damages?, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 348, 356–60 (2003) (explaining the refusal to enforce and
the complicated procedural history of the case).
Multiple cases have been filed against Germany in the Italian courts. For extended
analysis, see Antonio Cassese, The Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the Notion of
War Crimes: The Lozano Case, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1077, 1082–83 (2008); Carlo
Focarelli, Denying Foreign State Immunity for Commission of International Crimes: The
Ferrini Decision, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 951 (2005); Carlo Focarelli, Federal Republic of
Germany v. Giovanni Mantelli and Others, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 122 (2009). Italy has also
allowed Greek petitioners to enforce their judgments against German property in Italy. See
Annalisa Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction Over Germany in
a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War: The Civitella Case, 7 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 597, 601 n.23 (2009).
In 2008, Germany initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice challenging
Italy’s denial of immunity. See Application Instituting Proceedings on Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.) (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/143/14923.pdf. Greece has requested permission to intervene in the
proceedings. See Press Release, International Court of Justice, No. 2011/2 (Jan. 17, 2011).
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sponsors of terrorism.” 146 The European Court of Human Rights has held
that states are not required to deny immunity to states accused of human
rights abuses in their own territory 147—but has not held that states are
prohibited from denying such immunity.
International law has achieved even less clarity on the rules governing
foreign official immunity, particularly as applied to allegations of human
rights abuses. Two narrow rules are codified in widely ratified treaties:
Diplomats are immune from criminal prosecution and, with minor
exceptions, from civil lawsuits; 148 and consuls are immune “in respect of
acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.” 149 In addition, the
International Court of Justice has found that, as a matter of customary
international law, heads of state and foreign ministers are immune from any
claims filed while they are in office. 150
Two additional propositions seem clear. At one extreme, with the narrow
exception of the status-based immunities of current diplomats, heads of
state, and foreign ministers, foreign officials are not immune from suit for
private acts that are not attributable to the state. At the other extreme,
foreign officials are likely entitled to immunity when they perform acts as
the representatives of their governments: when, for example, an official
signs a treaty or signs a contract in the name of the government that
imposes a legal obligation on the state itself. 151
The most recent international effort to arrive at rules governing official
immunity, the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, finalized by the
146. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West 2011) (authorizing claims for torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage-taking against states on a list of “state sponsors of
terrorism”); 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2009) (identifying Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state
sponsors of terrorism).
147. See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67 (2001),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fe6c7b54.html (in a case against the
government of Kuwait alleging torture in Kuwait, holding that the United Kingdom did not
violate the European Convention on Human Rights when it dismissed the claim on the basis
of sovereign immunity); Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. No. 59021/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2002), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (follow “Case-Law; Decisions and judgments;
HUDOC database” hyperlink; click “This site in English” hyperlink; click “Decisions” box;
then enter search term “Kalogeropoulou”) (in a case challenging the Greek government’s
refusal to enforce the judgment against Germany in the Voiotia case, holding that a state
does not violate international law when it bars enforcement against another state of a
judgment based on human rights violations). For a summary of the Voiotia case, see supra
note 145.
148. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, states that a diplomat “shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State” and immunity from civil jurisdiction except in cases
involving private property in the receiving state or legal or commercial affairs “outside his
official functions.”
149. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261. The Convention recognizes an exception for civil actions “by a third party for
damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or
aircraft.” Id. art. 43(2)(b).
150. Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 51–58
(Feb. 14)).
151. See Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 29, at 68–69 (distinguishing between
“purely private” and “purely public” acts).
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General Assembly in 2004 but not yet in force, 152 is arguably consistent
with this approach. The Convention defines a state as including
“representatives of the State acting in that capacity.” 153 The International
Law Commission, in its 1999 Commentaries on the draft convention,
interpreted that language as including “all the natural persons who are
authorized to represent the State,” including “sovereigns and heads of
State,” and “heads of Government, heads of ministerial departments,
ambassadors, heads of mission, diplomatic agents and consular officers, in
their representative capacity.” 154 This language focuses on officials who
represent the state in its relationships with other governments, rather than
mandating application to all government employees. 155
During the drafting of the Convention, human rights advocates proposed
an explicit human rights exception to the immunity of foreign government
officials. 156 Some of those involved expressed concern that the failure to
include such language would permit immunity for the worst abuses,

152. See supra note 143 (noting that the 2004 Convention is not yet in force).
153. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 143, art. 2(1)(b)(iv).
154. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with
commentaries, [1991] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, 18, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/46/10. In the
subsequent paragraph, the commentary stated:
It is to be observed that, in actual practice, proceedings may be instituted, not only
against the government departments or offices concerned, but also against their
directors or permanent representatives in their official capacities. Actions against
such representatives or agents of a foreign Government in respect of their official
acts are essentially proceedings against the State they represent.
Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
The Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities also provides that a proceeding “shall be
considered to have been instituted against another State if . . . the proceeding in effect seeks
to affect the property, rights, interests or activities of that other State.” Id. at 23, art. 6(2)(b).
The 1991 commentary analyzed this language in terms of the property rights of states,
indicating that the “interests” involved primarily concern interest in property. See id. at 24–
25; see Jane Wright, Retribution but No Recompense: A Critique of the Torturer’s Immunity
from Civil Suit, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 175–76 (2010) (discussing focus on
property).
155. Hazel Fox has described this language as extending the immunity to any acts that are
attributable to the state. FOX, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 140, at 455. She reached this
conclusion in part by relying on principles of state responsibility that hold states responsible
for acts performed by individuals on their behalf. Id. at 457 (citing International Law
Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 7 (2001)). But
those same principles specify that state responsibility does not exclude individual
responsibility. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 31, 142, art. 58, U.N. Doc. A/56/10. Moreover, Fox based her argument on a
claim that state immunity is rendered meaningless if the government officials who act on
behalf of the state are denied immunity. FOX, STATE IMMUNITY, supra 140, at 456. As the
Supreme Court decision in Samantar makes clear, however, this proposition is not
universally accepted. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (quoting Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010)). The language of the Convention leaves open the
question as to whether it extends the immunity of the state to government officials who
commit human rights violations in the course of their employment.
156. Christopher Keith Hall, U.N. Convention on State Immunity: The Need for a Human
Rights Protocol, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 411, 412 (2006) (noting that drafters rejected
inclusion of specific reference to human rights and humanitarian law).
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including genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture.157 However, two
of the only eight states that had become party to the treaty as of July 2010
stated explicitly, as part of their formal ratification documents, that they
understood that the Convention did not bar future efforts to protect human
rights. 158 In the absence of specific language defining “representative
capacity,” even states that ratify the Convention will be neither required to
nor prohibited from recognizing immunity for human rights claims. Rather,
as in the pre-Convention state of the law, they will be left to resolve the
issue in accordance with their own interpretations of domestic and
international law.
State practice reflects increased acceptance of criminal and civil actions
against former foreign government officials. After a challenge to the
attempted prosecution of Chilean General Augusto Pinochet in the mid1990s, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords held that immunity did not
apply because it had been implicitly waived through ratification of the
Convention Against Torture. 159 The Statute of the International Criminal
Court includes a specific waiver of immunity. 160 Most states permit
domestic criminal prosecutions for some violations of international law
when the acts took place in another country, 161 and several states have
prosecuted former foreign officials for such crimes. 162 The growing body
157. Id. at 411. See generally id. (arguing for adoption of a “human rights protocol” to
ensure that the Convention is not interpreted so as to preclude human rights claims).
158. Norway and Sweden deposited identical declarations along with their instruments of
ratification, stating that each state “understands that the Convention is without prejudice to
any future international development in the protection of human rights.” See Status of the
U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: Declarations
and Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
III-13&chapter=3&lang=en.
159. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet, [1999]
2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.). Pinochet was arrested in England in 1998, after charges were filed
against him in Spain for torture and other abuses during his military dictatorship in Chile;
England held that he could be extradited to Spain, but declined to do so because of the poor
state of Pinochet’s health. For a general overview of the Pinochet case, see Michael Byers,
The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2000); Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311
(2001).
160. Article 27 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, titled “Irrelevance of
official capacity,” states:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative
or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute . . . .
2. [I]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the
Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
106.
161. As of 2001, over 125 countries permitted domestic prosecutions for some
international crimes, no matter where committed, according to Amnesty International.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 8 (2001).
162. One report lists criminal investigations or prosecutions in twelve European
countries, as well as Senegal, Canada, the United States, and Australia. JOSEPH RIKHOF,
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of domestic and international prosecutions of former government officials
for international crimes suggests, at a minimum, that international law does
not require that such officials receive immunity for crimes committed in the
exercise of governmental authority. 163
In the United States, as discussed in Part I, the courts have applied U.S.
foreign sovereign immunity laws to deny immunity to former foreign
officials in civil lawsuits seeking damages for violations of human rights.
Civil lawsuits are less common than criminal prosecutions in other
countries, at least in part because many domestic legal systems do not
permit such claims, permit them only as adjuncts to criminal prosecutions,
or impose other procedural barriers that make civil litigation difficult, if not
impossible. 164
In Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 165 the House of Lords declined to
extend the Pinochet decision, which denied immunity in a criminal
prosecution, to a civil claim. 166 Jones addressed the civil claims of a
British national who was arrested in Saudi Arabia and tortured while in
custody. The court held that Saudi Arabia and its officials were entitled to
immunity under the English immunity statute, reversing a lower court
holding in Jones’ favor. Although the Law Lords relied on different
theories, they all noted the distinction between civil and criminal liability
and concluded that the Convention Against Torture does not require that
FEWER P LACES TO HIDE? THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL IMPUNITY (2008), available at www.isrcl.org/Papers/2008/Rikhof.pdf. In
addition, Argentina has undertaken prosecutions of Spanish and Chinese officials. See
Matthew Robertson, Argentine Judge Issues Arrest Warrants for 2 Top China Officials,
Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan, for Genocide, EPOCH TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), available at
http://chinaview.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/argentine-judge-issues-arrest-warrants-for-2top-china-officials-jiang-zemin-and-luo-gan-for-genocide; Giles Tremlett, Argentinian
Judge Petitions Spain To Try Civil War Crimes of Franco, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 26, 2010,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/26/argentina-spain-general-francojudge.
163. See Memorandum by the Secretariat, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31 2008), at 116–
37, ¶¶ 180–207 (concluding that both domestic judicial decisions and international law
scholarship indicate a trend toward recognizing an exception to immunity for international
crimes); Inst. of Int’l Law, Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of
Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in Case of International Crimes, art. III (2009)
(Hazel
Fox,
Rapporteur),
available
at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/
resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf (stating that individuals who commit international
crimes are not entitled to conduct-based immunity); Bradley & Helfer, supra note 108, at
20–21 (discussing the likely emergence of an exception to conduct-based immunity in
criminal proceedings for jus cogens violations).
164. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1, 17–34 (2002) (discussing barriers to domestic civil claims for human rights violations).
For an example of a civil damage award appended to a criminal prosecution for human rights
abuses, see Milde v. Bottcher, Tribunale militare di La Spezia, Judgment No. 49 (Oct. 10,
2006, registered Feb. 2, 2007), summarized in Ciampi, supra note 145, at 597 (criminal
conviction followed by civil damages award that both ordered the defendant to pay damages
to the victims, who had intervened in the criminal proceedings, and held Germany jointly
and severally liable for the damages).
165. [2006] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Eng.).
166. Id. ¶ 19.
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states deny immunity for civil claims for torture. Canadian courts have
reached the same result, rejecting civil claims for torture filed by Canadian
citizens against Iran and Syria. 167 The Committee Against Torture, the
body of experts charged by the Convention with interpreting its provisions,
reached the opposite conclusion, stating that the Convention requires that
states provide civil redress to victims of torture, regardless of the sovereign
status of the perpetrator. 168
Efforts to distinguish between immunity for criminal and civil claims are
subject to challenge. The line between civil and criminal actions varies in
different legal systems:
Different parties initiate and conduct the
proceedings; the role of the judiciary varies; and the proceedings offer
different remedial schemes. 169 Criminal and civil claims can overlap,
particularly in civil law systems that permit private plaintiffs to join
criminal prosecutions.170 In addition, civil claims generally are less
onerous for the defendant than a criminal prosecution.
Finally,
international law has traditionally been less concerned with regulating
domestic civil litigation than with regulating domestic assertions of criminal
jurisdiction. 171 As a result, the civil/criminal distinction has only limited
value when assessing the remedies available in different legal systems.
International law governing accountability for human rights violations is
currently evolving, with strongly contested debates about how to resolve the
competing interests of human rights and sovereign immunity. In the
absence of definitive international law guidelines, each state will resolve the
conflict according to its own interpretations of international law and
domestic law. In the United States, this issue is influenced by a
longstanding recognition of government official liability for injuries
inflicted in the course of employment. This fundamental principle is
captured by the deeply ingrained practice of suing government officials in

167. Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 O.R. 3d 675 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Arar v.
Syrian Arab Republic (2005), 137 A.C.W.S. 3d 823 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). In both cases,
the Canadian courts held that the foreign states were entitled to immunity under the
Canadian immunity statute, and that the Convention Against Torture did not require that
states provide access to a civil remedy for torture committed outside of Canada.
168. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture: Canada, 34th Sess., May 2–20, 2005, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, at 3–4 (July 7,
2005); see Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 14(1) (“Each State Party shall
ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation . . . .”); id. arts. 17–19 (creating a
committee of experts to review compliance with the treaty and investigate violations of its
terms).
169. See Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/601, at 26–27, ¶¶ 53–
55 (May 29, 2008) (by Roman Anatolevitch Kolodkin) (noting that civil claims can arise out
of criminal prosecutions, and that civil proceedings are no more of an interference in the
internal affairs of a foreign state than criminal prosecutions); Stephens, Translating Filártiga,
supra note 164, at 17–21, 44–45 (discussing multiple ways in which different legal systems
define the relationship between criminal prosecutions and civil claims).
170. Stephens, supra note 164, at 19.
171. Id. at 50–51.
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their private capacity for acts committed in the course of their employment.
The next section discusses this approach and its relevance for the
development of a modern common law of foreign official immunity.
B. Official Capacity, Private Capacity, and Color of Law
Many foreign commentators find an inherent contradiction in the U.S.
recognition that acts committed by government employees under color of
law can form the basis for suing those employees in “a private capacity,”
rather than suing them “in an official capacity.” 172 The confusion stems in
part from the terminology: A personal capacity lawsuit against a
government employee indicates only that any judgment will run against the
employee personally, not the government itself.173 In personal capacity
suits, the officials “come to court as individuals,” while in “official capacity
suits,” they come as representatives of the government. 174 Personal
capacity suits seeking “the payment of damages by the individual
defendant” do not trigger sovereign immunity because “[t]he judgment
sought will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s
property.” 175 That is, U.S. law uses the terms “personal capacity” and
“official capacity” to categorize the capacity in which the government
official is sued, not to indicate whether or not the acts were performed in
the exercise of governmental authority. 176 Indeed, “personal capacity”
172. Antonio Cassese, for example, labels the distinction between “‘official’ and
‘unofficial public acts’” as “unsound and even preposterous from the strictly legal
viewpoint.” Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 869
(2002). Yet the central thesis of his article is that “official capacity” is not a defense to
liability for international crimes. He points out that such crimes are not committed “in a
private capacity.” Id. at 868. Instead, “individuals commit such crimes by making use (or
abuse) of their official status,” id., and lose their immunity when they commit international
crimes. Id. at 870–74. His position is consistent with the U.S. view that officials who abuse
their authority to commit crimes can be held personally accountable. The disagreement
seems to be with the terminology (calling challenges to such actions “private capacity”
lawsuits), rather than with the underlying concept of liability.
173. “When damages are sought from a government official, the officer is ordinarily sued
in a ‘personal’ or ‘individual’ capacity. This designation indicates that any judgment will be
assessed against the officer personally, rather than against the government employer.”
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 957 (6th
ed. 2009). By contrast, “When an official is sued for damages in an ‘official’ . . .
capacity, . . . the suit will be treated as one against the official’s employer.” Id. at 958. Suits
seeking equitable relief—seeking an order that would force the government to act—are also
generally termed suits in an official capacity. Id.
174. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
175. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687–88 (1949) (suit
against official for “compensation for an alleged wrong” is not against the state, but suit
seeking injunctive relief is against the state if it results in “compulsion against the sovereign,
although nominally directed against the individual officer”); see also Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (“[A] suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a state officer
in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct . . . so long as the relief is
sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally.”).
176. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26 (“[T]he phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best
understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in
which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.”).

2011]

FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

2699

lawsuits address actions taken within the course of employment and under
color of law: The plaintiff is seeking “to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” 177
Underlying this terminology is the principle that government employees
are not immune from suit for all acts committed under color of law. United
States domestic immunity law rests upon the longstanding belief that
employees should be held personally responsible when they cause harm
during the course of their employment. If the officer’s actions exceeded
limits on her authority imposed by controlling law, “actions beyond those
limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions.”178
Historically, government employees had no protection from liability
suits: “[T]he principle that an agent is liable for his own torts ‘is an ancient
one and applies even to certain acts of public officers or public
instrumentalities.’” 179 As a result, if a government employee committed a
tort or breached a contract, “the fact that the officer is an instrumentality of
the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from taking jurisdiction
over a suit against him.” 180 Because a tort by a government official was
considered to be, by definition, outside that person’s authority, it was a
personal tort triggering personal liability. Following the instructions of a
supervisor provided no protection: Employees were held responsible for
recognizing that their actions were unlawful. 181 This rule applied whether
or not the government was also held liable, and whether or not the
government was protected by sovereign immunity. Federal employees
were routinely sued and held liable for torts committed in the course of their
employment, even while the U.S. government—their employer—was
immune from suit. 182
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court began a process
that slowly extended immunity to some government officials.183 A small
set of government officials, such as judges and prosecutors, are now entitled
to absolute immunity for acts in the exercise of their professional
authority, 184 while others may be protected by “qualified immunity” if the
177. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
178. Larson, 337 U.S. at 689. By violating the law, “[t]he officer is not doing the
business which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the
sovereign has forbidden.” Id.
179. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580 (1943)).
180. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549,
567 (1922). “[T]he agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be answerable for his acts.”
Id.
181. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804) (holding the
commander of warship personally liable for damages caused to a captured ship, even though
he was following orders); see also Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double Standard of
Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1718, 1722 n.25 (2008).
182. For a history of U.S. government official liability, see Lin, supra note 181, at 1721–
22.
183. This evolution is detailed in Lin, id. at 1722–28.
184. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); FALLON ET AL., supra note 173, at
995, 998–1002 (discussing the absolute immunity of judges, prosecutors, legislators, and the
President).
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acts alleged do not violate “clearly established” statutory or constitutional
norms, “of which a reasonable person would have known.” 185 In 1988,
with the passage of the Westfall Act,186 Congress codified an additional
basis for official immunity. The Westfall Act provides that, if the Attorney
General certifies that an employee “was acting within the scope of his office
or employment,” the government will substitute into the lawsuit in place of
the employee, who is dropped from the litigation.187 The Westfall Act thus
permits the U.S. government to relieve government employees of personal
liability for acts committed within the scope of their employment.
Still central to U.S. domestic immunity law, however, is the principle that
government officials should be held personally responsible for acts that go
beyond the scope of their employment. As a Justice Department official
testified to the subcommittee that drafted the Westfall Act, “employees
accused of egregious misconduct—as opposed to mere negligence or poor
judgment—will not generally be protected from personal liability for the
results of their actions.” 188
Domestic and foreign sovereign immunity are based on different legal
foundations within U.S. law. 189 Nevertheless, U.S. judges and legislators
often borrow from domestic concepts when interpreting foreign sovereign
immunity. In particular, the U.S. recognition that acts committed under
color of law can trigger personal liability has heavily influenced the U.S.
view of foreign official immunity.
The Supreme Court applied the distinction between personal capacity and
official capacity lawsuits in Samantar, noting that Samantar had been sued
in his personal capacity for “conduct undertaken in his official capacity.”190
The Court thus recognized that the lawsuit was directed against Samantar as
an individual, not against the government that employed him at the time of
185. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807–08, 818.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006). This Act was known formally as the Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The government’s certification is subject to judicial
review. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 425–26 (1995).
188. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on H.R. 4358, H.R.
3872, H.R. 3083, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 79 (1988) (statement of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice).
Application of the Westfall Act to U.S. executive branch actions post-September 11,
2001, has been controversial, as courts have accepted the Attorney General’s certification
that acts were within the scope of employment if they were the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the employee’s job-related activities. See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All
in a Day’s Work? Scope of Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human
Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 198–204
(2008) (discussing and critiquing cases); see also Lin, supra note 181, at 1735–48 (same).
189. The Supreme Court has stated that domestic immunity rests upon the Constitution
and separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, while foreign
sovereign immunity is a matter of “grace and comity.” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–99 (1984) (domestic sovereign immunity is a constitutional limit on the power
of the judiciary).
190. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286 (2010).
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the acts, and regardless of the capacity in which he performed the acts at
issue in the complaint. The Court noted that “this case, in which
respondents have sued petitioner in his personal capacity and seek damages
from his own pockets, is . . . not a claim against a foreign state” 191
In a recent article, Jane Wright explained the concept of personal liability
for acts taken under color of law in her analysis of the “official capacity”
requirement of the Convention Against Torture:
[T]he definition of “torture” in Article 1 of [the Convention] requires the
act to have been carried out by a public official, but it does not say that
torture is an official act. An act can be carried out by an official without it
being an official act for the purposes of immunity. . . . [T]he international
crime is constituted by conduct carried out by an official but that conduct
is denuded of its status as an official act for the purposes of state
immunity. 192

As Professor Keitner has pointed out,
both U.S. and international law make individuals liable for engaging in
certain types of conduct precisely because they act under color of law. . . .
[I]t makes no sense for the very criteria that define a violation (such as a
requirement that the defendant acted under color of law) to shield the
defendant from legal consequences. 193

U.S. courts have relied heavily on the domestic concept of state action and
color of law in analyzing human rights claims filed against foreign officials.
In Kadic v. Karadžić, 194 for example, the Second Circuit held that “the
‘color of law’ jurisprudence” of the U.S. civil rights statute “is a relevant
guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action” sufficient to
trigger the jurisdiction of the ATS.195 The TVPA explicitly requires that
the defendant act “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation.” 196 The legislative history explains that this phrase “is used
to denote torture and extrajudicial killings committed by officials both
within and outside the scope of their authority,” and instructs courts to
“look to principles of liability under U.S. civil rights laws . . . in construing
‘under color of law.’” 197
191. Id. at 2292.
192. Wright, supra note 154, at 172. Ed Bates notes that, “by their reference to ‘official
capacity’ in Article 1, . . . the drafters of the [Torture] Convention were concerned with the
‘official’ status of the person inflicting ‘torture’ and not the debate as to whether or not
torture may be recognised as an ‘official’ act of the State for the purposes of State
immunity.” Ed Bates, State Immunity for Torture, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 651, 672 n.121
(2007) (citing J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE 45–46, 119–20 (1988); NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1999)).
193. Keitner, Officially Immune?, supra note 29, at 3, 6 (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 27–28 (1991)).
194. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
195. Id. at 245 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 694 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988)).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note), § 2(a) (2006).
197. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
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In the absence of binding international law rules governing the immunity
of foreign officials accused of human rights violations, each state develops
its own approach based on both its domestic law and its understanding of
international law. In the United States, domestic law includes the important
legal principle that government officials can be held liable for acts taken
under color of law in the course of their employment.
C. The Limited Value of Pre-FSIA Common Law
The courts will not be able to turn to pre-FSIA common law decisions
and commentary to determine the scope of the modern common law of
official immunity in part because the cases were sparse, leaving a few
guidelines but no substantial body of law. 198 As summarized in Part I, the
pre-1976 cases suggest only two general conclusions. First, foreign
officials were afforded immunity in cases in which a judgment would be
enforceable against the state. Second, the early common law cases offer no
indication that officials were entitled to immunity for acts outside of their
lawful authority. Even if the common law decisions had established a
cohesive common law of official immunity, however, modern common law
must reflect the current state of the law. That is, the common law of foreign
official immunity was not frozen in place in 1976, when the majority of the
lower courts (erroneously, we now know) assumed that it had been
displaced by the FSIA. Common law today must take into account
significant changes since 1976 in both international and U.S. law.
The international law governing human rights has expanded
exponentially over the past several decades. The prohibitions of genocide,
torture, and other egregious abuses have been adopted into widely ratified
treaties, 199 and several have been recognized as jus cogens norms. 200 Some
of those treaties require that states either prosecute or extradite persons
accused of violations, including officials who acted under governmental
authority. 201 Although no international body has held that international law
requires that states deny foreign officials immunity in civil lawsuits
alleging violations of these norms, 202 neither has any held that a denial of
immunity is prohibited by international law.203 That is, as Section A of this
198. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 16; Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States Nov. 4, 1988) [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. n (1987) (stating that the prohibitions against genocide, slavery, murder, and
torture, among others, constitute jus cogens norms).
201. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 16, art. 7 (providing that states
must either prosecute or extradite persons who torture).
202. Immunity from criminal prosecution, however, is prohibited by treaties such as the
Convention Against Torture and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. See supra
notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
203. The main exceptions, as noted earlier, are the immunities of diplomats and consuls,
which are required by treaty, and the customary international law immunities of heads of
states and foreign ministers. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
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part explains, given the lack of binding international law guidance, each
state must develop rules according to its own understanding of the
interaction between immunity doctrines and human rights norms.
United States law addressing accountability for human rights abuses has
also evolved significantly since 1976. 204 The United States has ratified
several major human rights treaties, including the Genocide Convention and
the Convention Against Torture, 205 and has implemented them through both
criminal and civil statutes.206 The 1980 Filártiga decision and dozens of
subsequent cases recognized a federal cause of action for human rights
abuses committed abroad, a holding affirmed by the Supreme Court in
2004. 207 The Executive Branch supported the Filártiga interpretation of
the ATS at the time 208 and has intervened only very rarely to assert
immunity for ATS defendants. 209 Most ATS claims have been filed against
former foreign government officials, and most courts have denied
defendants’ claims of immunity. The TVPA, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and
the “state sponsors of terrorism” exception to the FSIA each created explicit
civil causes of action permitting suits for torture and extrajudicial execution
against officials acting under color of foreign law.210
204. For an overview of U.S. human rights commitments, including treaties,
congressional oversight, and Executive Branch engagement with international treaty bodies,
see Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 395–96, 400–03 (2009).
205. Genocide Convention, supra note 199, was ratified in 1988, and the Convention
Against Torture, supra note 16, was ratified in 1994. During the same period, the United
States also ratified the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, opened for
signature June 25, 1957, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-3 (1991), 320 U.N.T.S. 291; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 9518 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, opened for signature June 17, 1999,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-5 (1999), 2133 U.N.T.S. 161; Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res.
54/263, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263/ (May 25, 2000); and Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263/ (May 25, 2000).
206. Implementing legislation includes 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006) (creating the crime of
genocide) and id. § 2340A (creating the crime of torture). Congress enacted the TVPA in
1992, in part, to implement U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture.
207. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (noting that its holding was
consistent with that of Filártiga).
208. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), 1980 WL 340146.
209. Most Executive Branch interventions to support an immunity claim on behalf of an
ATS defendant have addressed specialized immunities such as head-of-state immunity. See,
e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625–27 (7th Cir. 2004) (dismissing claim against
head of state based on Executive Branch statement of immunity); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844
F. Supp. 128, 131–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same).
210. See supra note 15.
In a pre-Samantar article, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith claimed that Congress had
done nothing to “alter” the pre-existing “common law backdrop,” which, they argued,
granted immunity to foreign officials. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 145–47. Even
if they were correct in their interpretation of the common law, they ignored the impact of the
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The impact of the TVPA on prior common law is particularly striking.
Congress in that statute created explicit causes of action for torture and
extrajudicial execution committed under color of foreign law.211 The clear
language of the statute thus applies to claims against foreign officials for
acts committed during the course of their employment. A blanket grant of
immunity to foreign officials who act under color of law would contradict
the statute. Such explicit statutory language overrides any pre-existing
common law provision granting immunity to defendants in TVPA suits, and
bars imposition of new common law rules that would conflict with the
statute. 212
In sum, when courts today determine the common law of foreign official
immunity, resuming a task that they put aside when the FSIA was adopted
in 1976, they will not apply the common law as it existed at that time, but
will instead develop new standards that draw upon current principles of
U.S. and international law.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, LAWFUL AUTHORITY, AND THE LIMITS ON
COMMON LAW IMMUNITY
A modern doctrine of foreign official immunity should start with the
limited guidance available from the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar,
and then look to the highly relevant analysis found in cases addressing
human rights claims under the ATS and applying the act of state doctrine.
Samantar made clear that not all foreign officials sued for actions taken
in the course of their employment are entitled to immunity. The Supreme
Court stated that the immunity of the state and that of the official are not coextensive. If they were identical, there would have been no need to
consider the application of procedural rules such as indispensable party and
real party in interest, and no need to refute the concern that a suit against a
foreign official would constitute an end-run around the immunity due to the
state. 213 The Executive Branch submission to the Court in Samantar
supported this approach, noting several factors, discussed below, that might
lead to the conclusion that foreign officials were not entitled to immunity
for particular acts taken in the course of their employment.
Many claims filed against foreign officials will be easily resolved
pursuant to the clear, albeit limited, guidance in the Samantar opinion,
because a foreign state is either an indispensable party or the real party in
interest. Those procedural protections parallel U.S. domestic immunity
principles that recognize that cases that would require an outlay of funds
developments discussed here: U.S. ratification of human rights treaties; multiple new
statutes that codify civil and criminal remedies against persons accused of violations of
fundamental human rights norms; and the court decisions discussed in Part III.
211. The statute creates a cause of action against “[a]n individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” subjects an individual to torture or
extrajudicial execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note), § 2(a) (2006).
212. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-55 (1989) (“[S]overeign immunity would not generally be an
available defense” to a TVPA claim).
213. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
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from the public treasury, or other government action, constitute claims
directly against the government. 214 The Restatement (Second) captured the
substance of these principles, stating that a claim against a foreign official
constitutes a claim against the state “if the effect of exercising jurisdiction
would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.” 215 A comment
following this section explained that officials do not have immunity “even
for acts carried out in their official capacity,” unless they are entitled to a
specialized immunity, such as head of state or diplomatic immunity, or the
claim seeks “to enforce a rule [of law] against the foreign state.”216 The
comment also provided two useful examples. First, a suit against a foreign
official seeking to enforce a contract by ordering payment from government
funds would “enforce a rule against the state”; as a result, the official is
protected by the immunity of the state. 217 Second, a foreign official
involved in a car accident during the course of employment and sued for
damages is not entitled to immunity. 218
In cases such as Samantar, plaintiffs allege violations of domestic and
international law and seek only “damages from [the defendant’s] own
pockets.” 219 A judgment in one of these cases, therefore, would neither
require an outlay from the foreign state’s treasury nor compel the state to
take an action. In the words of the Restatement (Second), a judgment
against the official would not “enforce a rule against the state.”
In human rights cases, however, foreign officials may argue that they
should receive immunity for intentional acts undertaken to support state
policies, even if their acts violated domestic and international law. In
rejecting such claims, courts can look to pre-Samantar decisions applying
the FSIA to foreign officials. Although those decisions have now been
overruled by Samantar to the extent that they relied on the FSIA, they
addressed an issue central to determination of the common law of official
immunity, holding that acts beyond the scope of an official’s authority are
not protected by the immunity of the state. In Chuidian v. Philippine
National Bank, 220 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the FSIA
immunized only acts by an official “committed in his official capacity,” but
not “acts beyond the scope of his authority.” 221 “‘[W]here the officer’s
powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are
considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing
the business which the sovereign has empowered him to do . . . .’” 222
214. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (sovereign immunity bars
claims against state officials when there is a “virtual certainty” that a judgment will be paid
by the state government, “not from the pockets of individual state officials.”).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66 (1965).
216. Id. cmt. b.
217. Id. cmt. b, illus. 2.
218. Id. cmt. b, illus. 3.
219. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 (2010).
220. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 1106.
222. Id. (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689
(1949)).
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Other circuits agreed, holding that immunity only applied to actions
taken in an official capacity and within the scope of authority. The Fourth
Circuit, for example, stated, “[a]lthough the [FSIA] is silent on the subject,
courts have construed foreign sovereign immunity to extend to an
individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state,” 223 but
“[t]he FSIA . . . does not immunize an official who acts beyond the scope of
his authority.” 224 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that “foreign sovereign
immunity extends to individuals acting in their official capacities as
officers,” but does not apply to officials who act outside the scope of their
authority. 225
In two human rights cases decided soon after Chuidian, the Ninth Circuit
applied the scope-of-authority test to bar immunity to foreign officials
accused of human rights abuses. In Trajano v. Marcos, 226 the circuit
recognized that the FSIA did not immunize an official who committed
abuses that were manifestly “beyond the scope of her authority” and
involved “doing something the sovereign has not empowered the official to
do.” 227 Similarly, in Hilao v. Marcos, 228 the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the abuses at issue were carried out under Ferdinand Marcos’
official authority and thus immunized, finding that “acts of torture,
execution, and disappearance were clearly acts outside of his authority as
President.” 229 As the “acts were not taken within any official mandate,”
they were not the acts of the foreign state.230
Both the Marcos litigation and Xuncax v. Gramajo, 231 a case against a
former Minister of Defense of Guatemala, involved high-ranking
government officials. The courts in those cases were not concerned with
the possibility that the defendants’ brutal actions might have been
consistent with the covert policies of their governments. To the contrary,
the Ninth Circuit held that “the illegal acts of a dictator are not ‘official
acts’ unreviewable by federal courts.” 232 The court in Xuncax also held that
223. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004).
224. Id. at 399.
225. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(officials may only be immunized for acts that fall within the scope of their authority).
226. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
227. Id. at 497.
228. Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1994).
229. Id. at 1472.
230. Id. (citation omitted). In Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175–76 (D. Mass.
1995), the court reached the same result. While questioning the result reached in Chuidian,
the Xuncax court found it unnecessary to decide whether the FSIA applied to foreign
officials, because the court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that any immunity
would “be unavailable in suits against an official arising from acts that were beyond the
scope of the official’s authority.” Id. at 175.
231. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
232. Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1471. The Hilao court also rejected Marcos’ argument that acts
outside the scope of his official authority (and thus not immunized by the FSIA) did not
violate international law because such acts were not committed under “color of law.” The
court held that “[a]n official acting under color of authority, but not within an official
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the defendant was not entitled to immunity because the acts alleged “exceed
anything that might be considered to have been lawfully within the scope of
[his] official authority.” 233 The district court in Doe I v. Liu Qi addressed
this issue directly, finding that acts were not within the scope of an
official’s lawful authority even if authorized by the “covert unofficial
policy” of his government. 234 Since “ultra vires actions are not subject to
sovereign immunity,” officials are entitled to immunity only if they act with
a “legally valid grant of authority.” 235
In its submission to the Supreme Court in Samantar, the Executive
Branch endorsed a similar limitation on the reach of foreign official
immunity, noting that “the basis for recognizing the immunity for current
and former foreign officials is that ‘the acts of the official representatives of
the state are those of the state itself, when exercised within the scope of
their delegated powers.’” 236 By quoting Underhill, a case applying the act
of state doctrine, in support of this point, the Executive Branch recognized
the close relationship between the factors underlying official immunity and
those relevant to the act of state doctrine. That doctrine precludes courts
“from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory,” in “the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles.” 237 The doctrine differs from sovereign immunity in that it is
rooted in constitutionally imposed separation of powers concerns, reflecting
the limited role of the judicial branch in foreign affairs.238 In addition, act
of state is a defense on the merits, whereas immunity deprives a court of
jurisdiction. 239 Despite these important differences, however, the analysis
of when an act that violates domestic or international law can be considered
a “public” act for the purposes of the act of state doctrine can assist the
courts in developing the common law of official immunity. Many of the
cases cited in cases analyzing foreign official immunity involve the act of
state doctrine. 240
Courts have recognized that the acts of an official “acting outside the
scope of his authority as an agent of the state are simply not acts of

mandate, can violate international law and not be entitled to immunity under [the] FSIA.” Id.
at 1472 n.8 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
233. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 176 (citing Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665,
673 (D.D.C. 1980)). “[A]ssassination is ‘clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as
recognized in both national and international law’ and so cannot be part of official’s
‘discretionary’ authority.” Id. (quoting Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673).
234. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
235. Id. at 1287 (citing United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.
1986)).
236. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 12 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F.
577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895), aff’d 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (emphasis added)).
237. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401, 428 (1964).
238. Id. at 423.
239. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010) (“[T]he act of state doctrine is
distinct from immunity, and instead ‘provides foreign states with a substantive defense on
the merits . . . .’” (quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004))).
240. See, e.g., id. (discussing Underhill and act of state doctrine).
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state.” 241 As a starting point, illegal acts are not “public acts” for purposes
of the doctrine 242: “[C]ommon crimes committed by the Chief of State
done in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it . . . are as far
from being an act of state as rape.” 243 This applies with force to human
rights violations. The TVPA legislative history, for example, states
explicitly that torture and similar violations of human rights can never be
considered the “public acts” required to invoke the act of state doctrine:
“Since this doctrine applies only to ‘public’ acts, and no state commits
torture as a matter of public policy, this doctrine cannot shield former
officials from liability under this legislation.” 244 The Ninth Circuit applied
this reasoning in In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation,245
holding that murders committed “by military intelligence personnel who
were acting under [direction of the head of military intelligence], pursuant
to martial law declared by” the nation’s president, were not acts of state.246
In addition, the act of state doctrine does not apply where acts are barred
by controlling international legal principles. As the Supreme Court stated
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 247:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international
justice. 248

Thus, the act of state doctrine would not preclude judicial review of claims
asserting human rights violations when the acts violate generally accepted
international law principles. 249
241. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
242. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889–90 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]e doubt
whether action by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of
Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation’s government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state.”); see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir.
1995).
243. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 558 (5th Cir. 1962). As the Second Circuit
noted in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250, a case involving allegations of genocide and war crimes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, including widespread rape and other torture, “[T]he appellee has not
had the temerity to assert in this Court that the acts he allegedly committed are the officially
approved policy of a state.”
244. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991) (citing Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.
1989)).
245. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
246. Id. at 496.
247. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
248. Id. at 428.
249. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987), in comments b and c to section 443, confirms that the act of state doctrine does not
preclude review of an act of a foreign state that violates widely accepted international law
norms, and emphasizes that courts can decide claims “arising out of . . . alleged violation[s]
of fundamental human rights.” Id. § 443 cmt. c; see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) (“International law does not recognize an act
that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act.”).

2011]

FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

2709

This standard fits neatly with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
ATS in Sosa, which held that courts implementing the statute should
recognize common law causes of action for clearly defined, widely
accepted violations of international law.250 As stated in Sosa, “federal
courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar
when [the ATS] was enacted.” 251 The Court noted that this standard is
“generally consistent” with the standard applied by the lower courts, which
had required that ATS claims be based on definable (or specific), universal
and obligatory norms. 252 Violations of clearly defined, widely accepted
international human rights norms—Sosa norms—are excluded from
consideration as acts of state and are outside the bounds of an official’s
lawful authority and, therefore, are not protected by official immunity.
The Executive Branch submission to the Supreme Court in Samantar,
which listed factors that suggest that Samantar may not be protected by
common law immunity, is consistent with this approach:
In this case, for example, the Executive reasonably could find it
appropriate to take into account [Samantar’s] residence in the United
States rather than Somalia, the nature of the acts alleged, [plaintiffs’]
invocation of the statutory right of action in the TVPA against torture and
extrajudicial killing, and the lack of any recognized government of
Somalia that could opine on whether petitioner’s alleged actions were
taken in an official capacity or that could decide whether to waive any
immunity that petitioner otherwise might enjoy. 253

Two of these factors—Samantar’s residence in the United States and the
lack of a recognized government in Somalia—are not relevant to all human
rights cases, although many defendants do reside in the United States.254
Two other factors, however, are generally applicable. First, the Executive
Branch focused on “the nature of the acts alleged,” and confirmed
elsewhere that the nature of the acts alleged is relevant to considering
“whether they should properly be regarded as actions in an official

250. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). Professors Randall and
Keitner, recognizing this convergence between the act of state and ATS standards, have
referred to a norm that satisfies the Sabbatino-Sosa tests as a “supernorm,” which they
define as “an international legal prohibition that has become so crystallized and entrenched
as to be effectively unquestionable and inviolable either by sovereign entities or by
individuals, particularly those acting under color of state authority.” Kenneth C. Randall &
Chimène I. Keitner, Sabbatino, Sosa, and “Supernorms”, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 559, 559 (Mahnoush Arsanjani, et al. eds. forthcoming).
251. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
252. See id. (citing In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
253. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 7; see also id. at 22–23 n.10, 25 (discussing
the relevance of the same factors).
254. The Statement of Interest filed by the Executive Branch after Samantar was
remanded to the district court emphasized these two points. See infra notes 283, 290 and
accompanying text.
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capacity.” 255 Egregious violations of human rights such as torture,
execution, and other abuses that meet the Sosa standard are not within the
lawful authority of a government official. Second, the Executive Branch
reference to the statutory right of action created by the TVPA indicated
support for the view that a common law of immunity should not supersede
Congress’ decision to authorize claims against foreign officials.
One early post-Samantar district court decision on foreign official
immunity reached a result consistent with the analysis in this part. In
Hassen v. Al Nahyan, 256 a U.S. citizen sued officials of the United Arab
Emirates, alleging that the defendants had abducted, imprisoned, and
brutally tortured him for almost two years.257 The court noted that the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had acted outside the scope of his
official position, and concluded that, as a result, he was not entitled to
immunity because he had not acted “on behalf of the state.”258 This
decision follows the pre-Samantar cases in recognizing that illegal acts
performed in the course of employment are not entitled to immunity.
The modern common law of foreign official immunity must take into
account international human rights norms and judicial and statutory
developments in the United States. Consistent with the current state of
international and domestic law, courts should decline to recognize the
immunity of foreign officials accused of violations of clearly defined,
widely accepted international human rights norms.
As in any issue touching upon foreign affairs, the views of the Executive
Branch and of the foreign government whose officials are facing civil
claims will often play an important role in a court’s evaluation of an
immunity claim. As explained in Part IV, however, excessive deference to
those views would undermine both the constitutional division of powers
between the executive and the judiciary and fundamental human rights
norms.
IV. THE DEFERENCE DUE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE FOREIGN
STATE
In cases touching upon foreign affairs, the courts generally give
deference to the views of the Executive Branch, the branch of the federal
government to which foreign affairs powers are assigned by the
Constitution. 259 The Executive Branch, in turn, often considers the views
of the foreign government concerned with the lawsuit. The Constitution,
however, does not mandate absolute deference on the key factual disputes at
issue in foreign official immunity cases. Moreover, the views of the foreign
255. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 25.
256. CV 09-01106 DMG (MANx) (C.D. Ca. Sept. 17, 2010).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). The court noted that the State Department had not
requested immunity for the defendant. Id. at 10.
259. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating that “[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government.”).
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government cannot be decisive: No government has the authority to
immunize its own officials when they commit violations of core human
rights norms.
A. The Role of the U.S. Executive Branch
In its submission to the Supreme Court in Samantar, the Executive
Branch chose unusual language to characterize the non-statutory immunity
protecting foreign officials from suit in U.S. courts: Rather than proposing
“common law” immunity, the brief suggested that “principles articulated
by the Executive Branch . . . govern the immunity of foreign officials from
civil suit for acts in their official capacity.” 260 The phrase appears carefully
crafted to express a central theme of the submission, which repeatedly states
that courts must follow the guidance of the Executive Branch when
deciding whether a foreign official is entitled to immunity. 261
Tellingly, the Supreme Court in Samantar made no reference to
“principles articulated by the Executive Branch,” considering instead
whether foreign officials might be protected by common law immunity.
The courts, not the Executive Branch, articulate common law rules. The
Court in Samantar quoted prior cases suggesting that, in prior practice, the
courts “typically” had surrendered jurisdiction when the Executive Branch
filed a Suggestion of Immunity. 262 The Executive Branch argued that this
deference to its views should be absolute, and offered two explanations for
that position. Neither rationale supports the sweeping conclusion that, in
the absence of legislative guidance, the courts must defer to the Executive
Branch in determining the scope of foreign official immunity. 263
260. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at 7–9, 11,
14 (using the same phrase). In its submissions in two earlier cases addressing this issue, the
Executive Branch used somewhat broader language, referring to “general principles of
sovereign immunity” in Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2255-RSWL), to “commonlaw immunity for foreign officials” in Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Matar
v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-10270), and to “[p]rinciples of
[c]ustomary [i]nternational [l]aw as [r]ecognized by the Executive” in U.S. Matar Amicus
Brief, supra note 63, at 5.
261. The Executive Branch Statement of Interest on remand in Yousuf v. Samantar
repeats this position with even more force, stating that courts “must . . . defer to Executive
determinations of foreign official immunity.” Statement of Interest, Yousuf v. Samantar,
supra note 92, at 6.
262. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010). The Court added, “We have
been given no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the
State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual official immunity.” Id. at
2291.
263. For a thoughtful examination of the constitutional and functional arguments asserted
in support of Executive Branch control over official immunity decisions, see Wuerth, supra
note 108, at 9–39. Wuerth argues that the few pre-FSIA decisions suggesting that Executive
Branch immunity decisions were binding on the courts were “wrongly reasoned—if not
wrongly decided,” id. at 6, and, in any event, those decisions are no longer controlling after
passage of the FSIA, id. at 13–14. She concludes that permitting the Executive Branch to
govern immunity decisions would constitute an unconstitutional extension of executive lawmaking powers. Id. at 16–35; see also Bradley & Helfer, supra note 108, at 35–36 (noting
that, although the views of the Executive Branch may be “relevant” to the development of
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First, the Executive Branch brief argued that immunity decisions are
constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, “as an aspect of the
Executive Branch’s prerogative to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the
United States.” 264 This is only partly accurate. Executive Branch
“suggestions of immunity” for heads of state and diplomats are controlling
on the judiciary, 265 in recognition of the Constitution’s assignment of the
power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” to the
President. 266 This power includes the recognition of both foreign
governments and those who represent them. 267 As a result, courts defer to
Executive Branch suggestions of immunity as to diplomats and heads of
state. The immunity of other officials, however, is not subsumed within
this constitutional power to recognize ambassadors. Those immunity
decisions turn upon issues of foreign law, international law, and foreign
policy as to which the courts afford deference to the views of the Executive
Branch, but do not automatically follow its views.268
The Supreme Court has pointedly refused to cede to the Executive
Branch control over cases touching upon foreign affairs. In Justice William
Douglas’ memorable words, absolute deference to the Executive Branch in
such cases would render the court “a mere errand boy for the Executive
Branch which may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts from the fire,
but not others.” 269 As Justice Lewis Powell stated, “a doctrine which
would require the judiciary to receive the Executive’s permission before

post-Samantar common law immunity, “the constitutional rationale” for deference to
Executive Branch views “is under-theorized and thus may be open to challenge,” and listing
the “countervailing considerations” that would point against deference to those views).
264. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 28.
265. See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]
determination by the Executive Branch that a foreign head of state is immune from suit is
conclusive . . . .”); Doe v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111 (D.D.C. 2005) (“When, as
here, the Executive has filed a Suggestion of Immunity as to a recognized head of a foreign
state, the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch immediately ceases.”). But see Republic of Phil.
by the Cent. Bank of Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797–99 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (declining
to defer to the Department of State’s suggestion of head-of-state immunity for the Philippine
Solicitor General because it constituted a “radical departure from past custom.”).
266. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
267. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 43 (2d ed. 1996) (“It
is no longer questioned that the President does not merely perform the ceremony of receiving
foreign ambassadors but also determines whether the United States should recognize or
refuse to recognize a foreign government . . . .”).
268. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (noting that “there is a
strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s
view of the case’s impact on foreign policy”); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677,
702 (2004) (suggesting that with respect to foreign sovereign immunity, “should the State
Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over
particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be
entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of
foreign policy”) (footnote omitted); Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 29, at 71–75
(concluding that Executive Branch views as to status-based immunity are entitled to absolute
deference, but not those as to conduct-based immunity).
269. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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invoking its jurisdiction” would violate separation of powers.270 Noting
that six members of the Court shared his view on this point, Justice William
Brennan added: “[T]he representations of the Department of State are
entitled to weight for the light they shed on the permutation and
combination of factors underlying the act of state doctrine. But they cannot
be determinative.” 271
Second, the Executive Branch asserted that absolute deference was the
practice prior to enactment of the FSIA, relying on pre-1976 case law.272
Although the Supreme Court has said that the courts in the past
“surrendered jurisdiction” after the Executive Branch filed a suggestion of
immunity, 273 there was little historical basis for this practice prior to 1943.
In The Schooner Exchange, for example, the Court received the views of
the Executive Branch,274 but conducted its own review of the relevant
international law doctrines. 275 As late as the early twentieth century, the
Court declined to follow the Executive Branch’s views. 276 In the 1952 Tate
Letter, the Department of State itself acknowledged that its views as to
sovereign immunity were not binding on the courts: “It is realized that a
shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that
the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the
executive has declined to do so.” 277
The Supreme Court cases supporting absolute deference, as Professor
Keitner has discussed, involved state ownership of ships or recognition of
foreign envoys—status questions that are constitutionally delegated to the
Executive Branch. 278 As to those issues, the Executive Branch’s views are
binding on the courts. The issue of how to categorize acts committed by a
foreign official does not fall within that binding power. It should be given
respectful deference, but not blindly followed.279

270. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 788–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 6 (“[C]ourts traditionally deferred to the
Executive Branch’s judgment whether the foreign state should be accorded immunity in a
given case.”).
273. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010) (describing process and
noting that it “was typically followed when a foreign official asserted immunity.”).
274. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117–19 (1812).
275. Id. at 135–47.
276. See Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 29, at 73, discussing Berizzi Bros. v.
Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), in which the Supreme Court declined to follow the
Department of State’s view that the steamship was not entitled to immunity.
277. Tate Letter, supra note 24 (emphasis added).
278. Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 29, at 71–75. As Keitner notes, “foreign
officials[,] unlike ships, may also be personally responsible for their conduct.” Id. at 75. She
concludes that “there is . . . no consistent, well-settled practice from which to infer a standard
of absolute deference to the Executive on questions of conduct-based immunity.” Id. at 73;
see also Wuerth, supra note 108, at 13, 30 (concluding that the holdings as to deference to
the Executive Branch in pre-1976 admiralty cases are no longer good law after enactment of
the FSIA).
279. But see Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (pre-Samantar decision
holding that, “in the common-law context, we defer to the Executive’s determination of the
scope of immunity”).
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In the decision on remand in Yousuf v. Samantar, the Executive Branch
filed a Statement of Interest stating that Samantar was not entitled to
immunity. 280 The district court then denied the defendant’s claim to
immunity, in an order that simply followed the government’s views. 281 The
Statement of Interest quoted in full the list of possibly relevant factors
included in the amicus brief that the Executive Branch submitted to the
Supreme Court in Samantar, including the nature of the acts alleged and the
fact that the plaintiffs relied on the TVPA. 282 The Statement of Interest,
however, focused on the application of two of the factors: The United
States did not recognize a government in Somalia, and Samantar resided in
the United States. 283 Since these factors controlled the immunity decision,
the submission included no further discussion of the other factors.
The district court’s response to the Statement of Interest may indicate
that, in cases where the Executive Branch concludes that a foreign official
is not entitled to immunity, some district courts will be inclined to follow
that conclusion without further discussion. Moreover, Yousuf turned in
part on the fact that the U.S. did not recognize a government in Somalia, a
status assessment that is constitutionally assigned to the Executive Branch.
As argued in this section, deference to a factual assessment of the lawful
authority of a foreign official raises distinct constitutional issues.
The views of the Executive Branch as to the immunity of a foreign
government official are binding on the courts only to the extent that they
determine the status of heads of state, diplomats, and other officials. As to
other issues, those views should be treated with respectful deference. The
courts should not consider such views binding when they concern the
question of whether a foreign official’s conduct falls within his or her
lawful authority. Indeed, in cases alleging violations of clearly defined,
widely accepted norms, there is little need for Executive Branch guidance
as to the unlawfulness of the defendant’s actions. The key issue has already
been determined by international law and by the Supreme Court’s
incorporation of those norms into federal common law in Sosa.
B. The Role of the Foreign State
Foreign states have only rarely intervened in U.S. human rights lawsuits
against their former government officials. Governments generally do not
claim the right to commit egregious human rights violations.284 Thus,
280. Statement of Interest, Yousuf v. Samantar, supra note 92.
281. The court order stated simply, “The government has determined that the defendant
does not have foreign official immunity. Accordingly, defendant’s common law sovereign
immunity defense is no longer before the Court.” Yousuf v. Samantar, 1:04cv1360
(LMB/JFA) (Feb. 15, 2011). As of April 14, 2011, the district court’s full written opinion
explaining the denial of immunity had not yet been released.
282. Statement of Interest, Yousuf v. Samantar, supra note 92, at 4 n.2.
283. Id. at 7–9.
284. As the Department of State informed the court during the Filártiga litigation, “no
government has asserted a right to torture its own nationals. Where reports of such torture
elicit some credence, a state usually responds by denial or, less frequently, by asserting that
the conduct was unauthorized or constituted rough treatment short of torture.” Memorandum
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when their officials face credible accusations of such violations, they
generally do not defend the litigation by asserting that the violations were
within the official’s lawful authority.
In a few cases, however, the state has asserted a claim to immunity on
behalf of its official. In Doe I v. Lui Qi, 285 a lawsuit alleging torture and
arbitrary detention of practitioners of Falun Gong, the government of China
asserted that because the defendant had “performed [his] functions and
duties in accordance with the power entrusted to [him] under [the] Chinese
Constitution and laws,” he was immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States. 286 In two cases against former Israeli government
officials, the government of Israel submitted letters stating in general terms
that “‘anything [the defendant] did in connection with the events at issue in
the suit[] was in the course of [his] official duties.’” 287
The Executive Branch has said that “the foreign state’s position on
whether the alleged conduct was in an official capacity would be an
important consideration in determining an official’s immunity.” 288 That
much seems uncontroversial: The foreign state’s views as to whether an
official was acting within the course of her employment and as to the
legality of those actions under domestic law should certainly play a role in
the assessment of immunity.
For several reasons, however, those views cannot be determinative.
Samantar reflects one difficulty. In that case, the district court deferred to
the views of an unrecognized government that claimed that Samantar’s
actions fell within his official authority, despite the plaintiffs’ complaint
that the officials who signed the letters had ties to the same abusive
government that, along with Samantar himself, engaged in multiple human
rights violations. 289 The United States has not recognized a government in
Somalia, and the Executive Branch relied heavily on that fact in concluding
that Samantar was not entitled to immunity. 290
Additional problems would arise if an abusive government asserted a
claim to immunity on behalf of its officials. For example, what if the
Samantar lawsuit had been filed earlier, when the government he served
was still the lawful government of Somalia? The United States recognized
of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16 n.34, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (quoted in Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 884).
285. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
286. Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on “Falun Gong”
Unwarranted Lawsuits (unpaginated) at 3, 5, attached to Notice of Filing of Original
Statement by the Chinese Government, Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (No. C 02 0672
(EMC)).
287. See Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Letter from
Daniel Ayalon to Nicholas Burns, supra note 76).
288. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 25 (emphasis added).
289. See Brief of Appellants at 9–10, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009)
(No. 07-1893), 2007 WL 4355216 at *9, (noting allegation that at least one of the officials
who had claimed that Samantar acted within his official authority was “a longtime political
ally” of Samantar).
290. Statement of Interest, Yousuf v. Samantar, supra note 92, at 7–9; U.S. Samantar
Brief, supra note 85, at 7, 25–26.
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that government at the time, but also accused it of responsibility for
widespread human rights violations.291 If that government had submitted a
letter to the court stating that Samantar’s alleged acts of torture, prolonged
arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial executions were all within his lawful
authority, the courts would not have been required to give credence to that
view: Despots who control a state should not be empowered to invoke
sovereign immunity to protect officials accused of violations of clearly
defined, widely accepted human rights norms.
Finally, even democratic, lawful governments have no right, under
international or U.S. law, to protect their former officials from
accountability for violations of fundamental human rights norms. In Sosa,
the Supreme Court recognized common law causes of action for a small
number of international norms that prohibit the most egregious human
rights violations. Those same standards define the outer limits of lawful
authority: international law norms that are clearly defined and widely
accepted. Acts that violate Sosa norms do not trigger foreign official
immunity, no matter the views of the foreign state.
The importance of invoking core international law norms as a limit on
acts entitled to immunity becomes clear if we consider the possibility of a
state that authorizes genocide, defined by international law as “acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.” 292 If an official from that state were sued for
genocide, the common law of official immunity would not protect him,
even if local law clearly legalized his actions. United States courts would
not be bound to respect or apply the genocide-authorizing local law. As a
structural matter, foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of comity. In the
absence of a statute or binding treaty governing foreign official immunity,
U.S. courts are not required to ignore the gravity of the accusations when
determining whether a foreign official is entitled to immunity. In addition,
both international and domestic laws prohibiting genocide would override
the contradictory foreign law. Finally, as a matter of public policy, U.S.
courts should refuse to give legal effect to a foreign law that contradicts a
basic tenet of both international and U.S. law.
In the Liu Qi case, plaintiffs asserted that the defendant was responsible
for the torture and detention of members of the Falun Gong and alleged that
the Chinese government had targeted the group for violent repression solely
because of its members’ beliefs, a clear violation of international law.293
Under the modern common law of official immunity, the court was justified
in rejecting the Chinese government’s claim of immunity for the defendant,
because his acts violated clearly defined, widely accepted international law
norms.

291. U.S. Samantar Brief, supra note 85, at 4 (the United States recognized the
government in power at that time); id. at 3 n.2 (“At the time, the State Department
documented massive human rights violations by the Somali government.”).
292. Genocide Convention, supra note 199, art. 2.
293. Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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The two cases against Israeli officials illustrate another problem with
deference to the views of the foreign state. In those cases, the Israeli
government declined to address the specific acts alleged in the complaints.
In Belhas, plaintiffs sued for damages caused by an attack on a refugee
camp that caused over one hundred deaths and many injuries, in violation of
the laws of war. 294 In Matar, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was
responsible for bombing an apartment building at night in order to kill one
person, knowing that many civilians would be killed and injured, in
violation of the laws of war. 295 Rather than asserting that those specific
acts were within the lawful authority of the defendants, Israel, in each of the
cases, stated in general terms that “‘anything [the defendant] did . . . in
connection with the events at issue [in the suit] was in the course of [his]
official duties.’” 296
This general statement is not a sufficient basis to invoke common law
immunity. As the Supreme Court made clear in Samantar, not all acts
undertaken in the course of government employment trigger immunity. At
the very least, foreign state submissions seeking to invoke immunity for
their officials should address the key issue: Were the acts alleged within
the lawful authority of the official, as circumscribed by clearly defined,
widely accepted international law norms? In the Belhas and Matar cases,
Israel might claim that its acts complied with human rights and
humanitarian law. But it failed to make that argument to the courts in either
case and thus failed to justify recognition of common law immunity. 297
V. THE MODERN COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Samantar decision left to the federal courts the task of developing
the modern common law of foreign official immunity. As with any
common law doctrine, the full contours of that immunity will emerge over
294. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1281–82 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
295. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 10–11 (2d Cir. 2009).
296. Id. at 11 (quoting Letter from Daniel Ayalon to Nicholas Burns, supra note 76);
Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1284 (same).
297. The Belhas and Matar cases are outliers and may in fact reflect the “special
relationship” between the United States and Israel that constrains both the courts and the
Executive Branch. See, e.g., ABRAHAM BEN-ZVI, THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL: THE
LIMITS OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP (1993); Noura Erakat, Litigating the Arab-Israeli
Conflict: The Politicization of U.S. Federal Courtrooms, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. &
ISLAMIC L. 27 (2009) (discussing the politicization of litigation involving claims against
Israel); Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship,
in DAVID W. LESCH, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL REASSESSMENT 233 (1996). If those constraints are the true reasons for
dismissing the cases, it would be better to address them directly, rather than ignore
international law limits on a government official’s lawful authority. As many courts and
commentators have pointed out, courts can respond to any diplomatic or foreign policy
problems triggered by human rights litigation through application of doctrines such as the act
of state doctrine, the political question doctrine, or forum non conveniens. For an early
discussion of such doctrines, see Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs:
Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX. INT’L L.J.
169, 203–04 nn.112–13 (1987).
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time, in response to myriad factual situations. Two principles, however,
define its outer limits. First, foreign officials should be afforded common
law immunity if a claim is one that would force the government to act, as
when a case seeks damages from the state itself or requests an order that
would bind the foreign state. Second, at the other end of the immunity
spectrum, common law should not grant immunity to foreign officials for
violations of clearly defined, widely accepted human rights norms, because
those acts are, as a matter of international and U.S. law, beyond the
officials’ lawful authority.
Within that framework, the post-Samantar common law should include
the following key points:
(1) Suits against foreign officials in a personal capacity, that do not seek
to compel the state to act or require payment from the foreign treasury and
in which the state is neither an indispensable party nor the real party in
interest, are not suits against the foreign state and do not trigger that state’s
sovereign immunity. If sovereign immunity extends to acts taken in a
representative capacity, such immunity applies only to formal acts on behalf
of the state such as signing a treaty, entering into a contract, or otherwise
binding the state.
(2) The federal courts may conclude that common law immunity extends
beyond these situations to cover foreign officials engaged in lawful
activities as part of their employment. To the extent that they do so,
however, they should recognize the constraints imposed by international
human rights norms. Foreign official immunity does not apply to acts
outside of the official’s lawful authority. Violations of clearly defined,
widely accepted international human rights norms are outside lawful
authority, and acts in violation of those norms do not fall within the scope
of foreign official immunity.
(3) Courts should defer to the Executive Branch suggestions of immunity
to the extent that they indicate the status of a foreign official or a foreign
government as, for example, in recognizing an official as a diplomat,
consul, or head of state, or indicating whether the U.S. government
recognizes a foreign government. Courts should give only respectful
deference to Executive Branch conclusions about the factual allegations at
issue in a human rights complaint, such as, for example, whether the acts
alleged fall within the lawful authority of an official. And courts should not
defer to requests for immunity from foreign governments that seek to
immunize acts that violate clearly defined, widely accepted human rights
norms.
CONCLUSION
Supporters of absolute immunity defend it as a deeply rooted historical
practice, necessary to the smooth functioning of government. These
arguments, however, exaggerate its proper role. Absolute immunity is a
distortion of much narrower historical principles of sovereignty and
sovereign immunity and has little justification in a world that has moved
beyond monarchies and the divine rights of kings. Moreover, absolute
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immunity ignores modern international law limits on lawful government
authority. The new common law of foreign official immunity should
recognize that the most egregious human rights abuses are not within the
lawful authority of a state official and, therefore, are not entitled to
immunity.

